Ex Tempore Contracting by Verstein, Andrew
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 55 | Issue 5 Article 5
Ex Tempore Contracting
Andrew Verstein
Copyright c 2014 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
Andrew Verstein, Ex Tempore Contracting, 55 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1869 (2014),
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol55/iss5/5
EX TEMPORE CONTRACTING
ANDREW VERSTEIN*
ABSTRACT
This Article argues that a cornerstone assumption of contemporary
contracts scholarship is misleading and limited. Leading academic
commentary explicitly assumes that contractual responsibilities are
determined in the following way: parties determine many of their
duties ex ante, by specifying terms at the time of contract formation,
and leave the rest of the terms vague, for a court to specify ex post if
any should prove important. This ex ante / ex post dichotomy is the
guiding framework in attempts to understand contract design and
interpretation. For example, parties use terms like “merchantable”
quality when the cost of being more specific up front is higher than
the cost of relying on a court to later elaborate its meaning. Yet this
dichotomy obscures a third, “real-time” approach to contracting:
parties frequently leave terms unspecified and delegate ongoing
determination to someone other than a court. This Article identifies
this phenomenon, which can be called—as opposed to ex ante and ex
post—“ex tempore” contracting. 
Using a unique cache of data only recently made available, this
Article explores ex tempore contracting through a novel dispute
management system now prevalent in the construction industry
called a “dispute board.” These expert panels radically reduce the
* Assistant Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law. Acknowledgments:
Abundant thanks to Quinn Curtis, Timothy Davis, Victor Goldberg, Henry B. Hansmann,
Jonathan R. Macey, Christopher Meazell, John Morley, Rebecca Morrow, Gabriel V.
Rauterberg, Roberta Romano, Robert E. Scott, Natalya Shnitser, Omari Simmons, Kate Stith,
and Justin Sweet for providing excellent comments on early drafts. Thanks also to the
participants at the Law and Economics Workshop on Contracts and Economic Organization
at Columbia Law School and at the National Business Law Scholars Conference at the
University of Cincinnati. Thanks finally to Ian Ayres, Barbara Black, Jeffrey Gordon, Mark
A. Hall, Avery Katz, Yair Listokin, Minor Meyers, and Abraham Wickelgren for excellent
comments.
1869
1870 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:1869
cost and frequency of litigation by determining the parties’ responsi-
bilities whenever the parties wish, including in the course of
performance. Ex tempore contracting is not merely a dispute
resolution system for the construction industry. Ex tempore contract-
ing is also essential to the massive financial derivatives market and
countless other transactions. This Article develops important insights
for judicial interpretation of contracts and the scholarly analysis
thereof. For example, the possibility of ex tempore contracting casts
doubt on the wisdom of information-forcing penalty defaults and
urges courts to enforce ex tempore contracting clauses much more
often than they currently do.
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INTRODUCTION 
This Article argues that the dominant view of contract design and
interpretation is fundamentally limited and misleading. This view
is that parties have precisely two options with respect to any given
future circumstance: clearly specify their responsibilities to one
another at contract formation or leave their responsibilities vague,
relying on a court to determine them after performance.1 For
example, a construction contract could specify the use of Reading
brand pipe in exchange for $77,000.2 This ex ante contracting
approach involves thorough negotiation and drafting. Alternatively,
ex post contracting enlists a court to later specify an incomplete
contract by calling for “merchantable” pipe in exchange for a
“reasonable” fee, and then litigating whether the tendered pipe or
payment met the contractual requirement. Concerning interpreta-
tion, scholars generally advise courts to interpret in whatever way
helps parties to lower the sum of those two costs.3
Though intuitive and widely accepted, the ex ante / ex post dichot-
omy leaves out a third, “real-time” approach to contracting, in which
a third-party agent specifies the contract for the parties. Following
the language of ex ante, which means “before the fact,” and ex post,
which means “after the fact,” this Article introduces “ex tempore,”
which means “in the moment.” 
Parties utilize ex tempore contracting techniques when they draft
largely incomplete agreements at contract formation but provide a
means for ongoing completion in the course of performance. For
1. See, e.g., Albert Choi & George Triantis, Strategic Vagueness in Contract Design: The
Case of Corporate Acquisitions, 119 YALE L.J. 848, 852-53 (2010); Ronald J. Gilson et al.,
Contracting for Innovation: Vertical Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration, 109 COLUM.
L. REV. 431, 451-55 (2009); Jody S. Kraus & Robert E. Scott, Contract Design and the
Structure of Contractual Intent, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1023, 1026-27 (2009); Richard A. Posner,
The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1581, 1583 (2005); Robert
E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE L.J. 814
(2006); cf. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law,
113 YALE L.J. 541, 594-95 (2003) (arguing that the “default” terms that courts insert into an
agreement when the parties do not agree on a term are often inefficient).
2. Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 890 (N.Y. 1921).
3. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 1, at 1584 (“The object of judicial enforcement of contracts
is to minimize the sum of these two types or stages of costs, the drafting-stage costs and the
litigation-stage costs.”).
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example, parties might include a vague term, such as “merchant-
able” or “reasonable,” but then stipulate that a certain individual
shall define that term as the need may arise. This approach allows
the parties to have clarity of obligation at or around performance,
avoiding costly disputes while economizing on front-end costs. 
Though largely unnoticed, ex tempore contracting is extremely
widespread in some industries. The construction industry, which
employed 6 percent of all Americans (12 percent if production,
hauling, and distribution of equipment and materials are included)
prior to the recent economic downturn and contributed 8 percent to
GDP,4 stands at the forefront of ex tempore contracting. It is now
common practice for construction contractors to draft incomplete
contracts and entrust a cadre of neutral experts, the dispute board,
to make decisions whenever a given issue becomes salient. Such
boards answer questions the parties have not specified, such as: “Is
there a duty to help the contractor find qualified employees?”5 or
“Does the contract require the owner to audit and review the
subcontractor’s costs before disputing them?”6 Dispute boards are
becoming the norm in construction contracts because of their
startling effectiveness in improving projects; in an industry in which
25 percent of projects lead to disputes,7 dispute boards resolve 98
percent of claims brought before them.8
Likewise, the credit derivatives market, constituting a titanic $27
trillion in notional value,9 has turned to ex tempore contracting to
allow agile and effective contracting in a time of economic and
regulatory change. Complex derivatives routinely include seemingly
vague terms combined with techniques for achieving instantaneous
4. REDUCING CONSTRUCTION COSTS: USES OF BEST DISPUTE RESOLUTION PRACTICES BY
PROJECT OWNERS, 149 FED. FACILITIES COUNCIL 1, 1 (2007).
5. See, e.g., CYRIL CHERN, CHERN ON DISPUTE BOARDS 206 (2d ed. 2011).
6. See Marine Industrial Park Tunnel Case History, DISP. RESOL. BOARD FOUND. F., May
2004, at 19, 19.
7. REDUCING CONSTRUCTION COSTS, supra note 4, at 1. Construction litigation also
predominates scholarly attention. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Reconstructing Construction
Law: Reality and Reform in a Transactional System, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 463, 494 (noting that
nearly 20 percent of cases in JOHN P. DAWSON ET AL., CASES AND COMMENT ON CONTRACTS (6th
ed. 1993) are construction cases); id. (noting substantial emphasis on construction cases in
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts).
8. REDUCING CONSTRUCTION COSTS, supra note 4, at 16. 
9. Vanessa Mock et al., CDS Case Planned in Europe, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 2013, at C1.
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clarification. For example, many owners of Greek bonds had
protected themselves against the risk of nonpayment by entering
into credit default swaps (CDS).10 These insurance-like derivatives
offered payment to the bondholders if Greece were to renege on its
obligations.11 As Greece grew increasingly reluctant to pay its debts,
bondholders did not look to the contract text nor to a court to
determine whether they were entitled to payment under the CDS.
Instead, a committee of the dominant trade association, the
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), had
authority to rapidly clarify entitlements and define the word
“default.”12 Few have noticed the quasi-adjudicative role played by
ISDA, which has proven invaluable in facilitating the use of credit
default swaps and, at times, reducing systemic risk. Fewer still have
noticed that one can best understand this function as an expression
of ex tempore contracting.13 
Despite the prevalence of ex tempore contracting, courts, parties,
and scholars have been slow to recognize its significance. As a
result, courts misunderstand and frustrate parties’ contractual
choices and disrupt the usefulness of ex tempore contracting. For
example, courts sometimes mistakenly characterize ex tempore
contracting as mere mediation14 and thereby permit parties to
frustrate the ex tempore determination process, say, by refusing to
select board members15 or even to attend at all.16
At a more abstract level, the failure to notice ex tempore contract-
ing has led scholars to overestimate their understanding of contract
design and judges’ ability to improve it with simple changes in
10. Otto Sandrock, The Case for More Arbitration When Sovereign Debt Is to Be
Restructured: Greece as an Example, 23 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 507, 516 (2012).
11. See M. Todd Henderson, Credit Derivatives Are Not “Insurance,” 16 CONN. INS. L.J. 1
(2009) (describing the ways in which derivatives are and are not like insurance). Note that
one may purchase CDS protection without actually owning Greek bonds. 
12. See Agustino Fontevecchia, ISDA Says Greece in Default, CDS Will Trigger, FORBES
(Mar. 9, 2012, 2:51 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/afontevecchia/2012/03/09/on-greece-
defaults-and-the-future-of-derivatives/ (noting ISDA’s decision that Greece’s restructuring
constituted a default).
13. See infra Part III.B. 
14. Bombardier Corp. v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 298 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2002).
15. G & T Conveyor Co. v. Port of Seattle, 2008 WL 682242, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 7,
2008).
16. L.A. Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth. v. Shea-Kiewit-Kenny, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 431, 435 (Ct.
App. 1997).
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interpretation techniques. For example, courts sometimes apply
penalty defaults in cases of contractual silence in order to cause
parties to contract more explicitly and thereby disclose important
information to one another.17 In one such case, Hadley v. Baxendale,
a court denied recovery of unforeseeable consequential damages for
a broken crankshaft,18 even though most parties would probably
prefer the defendant to be liable for all such damages.19 Scholars
have defended Hadley as encouraging parties to communicate and
negotiate.20 Yet opportunistic parties can circumvent information-
forcing defaults if they can instead furtively opt for ex tempore
contracting. 
In offering a challenge to the dominant contract design paradigm,
this Article takes up a call for research extending the existing
literature.21 Oliver Williamson identifies a type of “trilateral
governance,” in which third-party agents are used to update or
modify incomplete contracts on an ongoing basis.22 He even men-
tions architects’ preliminary adjudicatory role at construction sites,
a precursor to the dispute board discussed in Part II.A, as an ex-
ample of trilateral governance.23 This foreshadowing of ex tempore
contracting allows it to be considered within the family of the
relational contracting and transaction costs economics literature. By
17. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989).
18. (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 9 Ex. 341.
19. Cf. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 44 (1991) (proposing that default rules should be what parties would choose
if given full information); Eric Maskin, On the Rationale for Penalty Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 557, 560 (2006) (“[N]ormal damages are not ‘consistent with what fully informed
parties would have wanted.’ ”); Eric A. Posner, There Are No Penalty Default Rules in Contract
Law, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 563, 574 (2006) (“Since the Hadley rule excludes the unforeseeable
portion of any loss, it is not majoritarian.”).
20. See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner, supra note 17, at 101.
21. See Scott & Triantis, supra note 1, at 822 (“A more complete theory of contract design
would anticipate all possible back-end processes and the interaction among them. Our
analysis thus calls for further research into the interaction between contract and litigation,
as well as future investigation into the effect of other back-end processes, such as arbitration,
renegotiation, and settlement.”) (footnotes omitted).
22. Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual
Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233, 249-50 (1979).
23. Id. at 250; accord Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic
Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 854,
866 (1978). 
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providing a detailed discussion of ex tempore contracting in
construction and financial derivatives, this Article explores William-
son’s insight for its deep potential.24 
The Article will proceed as follows: Part I reviews recent litera-
ture on contractual completeness and the ex ante / ex post dichot-
omy in order to situate ex tempore contracting. It then introduces
ex tempore contracting and analyzes the main drivers of its
usefulness. Ex tempore contracting is attractive when interim
determination of responsibilities is preferable to doing so at contract
formation or after performance and when agent determination of
responsibilities is preferred to party or court determination. The
former requirement will correspond to circumstances in which
uncertainty is high but coordinating is costly for parties. The latter
will occur when uncertainty is high and the parties value clarity at
the time of performance, post-transaction relief is unlikely to be
complete, or it is difficult for the many parties to coordinate a
settlement. This analysis is of great importance in continuing to
analyze important contracting realities and the forces that drive
them. It also guides discussion of subsequent examples of ex
tempore contracting. 
Part II applies this theory to examples of ex tempore contracting.
Section A looks at the use of ex tempore contracting in construction
through dispute boards. In addition to its role in advancing this
Article’s theoretical contribution, the discussion of dispute boards
constitutes a significant contribution in its own right as the first
extended academic treatment of this fascinating innovation in
dispute management. Despite their revolutionary potential, dispute
boards are almost unknown to scholars of contracts and dispute
resolution25 and barely examined even by those scholars who care
about construction law.26 This Section explores diverse uses of
24. Yet architect determination is in decline, for reasons that help justify the dispute
board. See infra note 186 and accompanying text.
25. No doubt, this is because dispute boards are most closely associated with construction,
an area that attracts little scholarly interest. See William A. Klein & Mitu Gulati, Economic
Organization in the Construction Industry: A Case Study of Collaborative Production Under
High Uncertainty, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 137, 138 (2004) (“Legal and economic scholars have
devoted little attention to an industry—construction—that seems to offer valuable lessons
about the organization of economic activity.”); Stipanowich, supra note 7, at 495-96 (lamenting
the state of construction scholarship).
26. See 6 PHILLIP L. BRUNER & PATRICK J. O’CONNOR, JR., BRUNER AND O’CONNOR ON
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disputes boards, their advantages, and their risks, utilizing a cache
of dispute board decisions that the State of Florida recently made
public. Section B describes the role of ex tempore contracting in
credit derivatives transactions, in which complicated financial
relations are governed by apparently incomplete agreements whose
clarity and specification come in the course of performance. 
Having established the pervasiveness of ex tempore contracting,
Part III then draws out the implications of ex tempore contracting.
Section A examines the judicial treatment of ex tempore institu-
tions, showing how courts can better support parties informed
choice of ex tempore contracting by allowing its use even when a
court may find it otherwise futile or unconscionable. Section B
problematizes the judicial and scholarly treatment of penalty
defaults. Section C then speculates as to how parties might choose
to better use ex tempore contracting in the future, such as including
it alongside earnout agreements in M&A contracts.
I. CONTRACTUAL COMPLETENESS
A. Ex Ante and Ex Post Contracting
Economic analysis of contracts has long accepted as optimal “the
complete contingent contract that [clearly] specifies the obligations
of the parties in each possible future state of the world.”27 Complete
contracts reduce enforcement costs and encourage efficient invest-
ment,28 create efficient terms of exchange in each state of the world,
and facilitate efficient trade.29 When contracts are vague or
incomplete, obligations are unclear and parties risk vexatious
litigation and inefficient performance. 
CONSTRUCTION LAW § 21.11, at 929 (2002) (noting the rise of dispute boards); 1 JUSTIN SWEET
& JONATHAN J. SWEET, SWEET ON CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY CONTRACTS § 8.01 (5th ed. 2009)
(mentioning dispute resolution boards (DRBs) only one time); JUSTIN SWEET, SWEET ON
CONSTRUCTION LAW § 12.11, at 474 (1997) (calling for more research into dispute boards).
27. George G. Triantis, The Efficiency of Vague Contract Terms: A Response to the
Schwartz-Scott Theory of UCC Article 2, 62 LA. L. REV. 1065, 1068 (2002).
28. See Scott & Triantis, supra note 1.
29. Triantis, supra note 27, at 1068.
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Given the costs, scholars of contracts have long found the
persistence of vague terms “puzzling.”30 If incomplete contracting,
in the form of vague or absent terms, leads to so many problems,
why not attempt far more complete contracting? Put simply,
complete contracting is costly. Parties must imagine,31 negotiate,32
and draft specific terms.33 Demanding completeness can damage
trust,34 limit relational contract enforcement35 or informal enforce-
ment,36 or threaten the deal altogether.37 Guaranteed costs attend
drafting a marginally more complete contract, but one must
discount the benefits of completeness by the chance that a given
contingency never even arises, and so the marginal completeness
has no effect on incentives.38 Finally, some terms are so costly to
enforce, and therefore so unlikely to be invoked if at all, that parties
see little benefit to including them in the contract.39 As a result of
30. E.g., id. at 1067.
31. See Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset
Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 267-68 (1984); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of
Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1090-91 (1981); Jean Tirole, Incomplete Contracts:
Where Do We Stand?, 67 ECONOMETRICA 741, 771-72 (1999) (explaining the existence of
incomplete contracts partially in terms of unforeseen contingencies).
32. See Mark P. Gergen, The Use of Open Terms in Contract, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 997, 1029-
30 (1992) (arguing that haggling over the value of an uncertain asset, or investigating it, is
wasteful from a social point of view).
33. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 17, at 92-93 & n.30 (“[C]osts may include legal fees,
negotiation costs, drafting and printing costs, the costs of researching the effects and
probability of a contingency, and the costs to the parties and the courts of verifying whether
a contingency occurred.”).
34. See William C. Whitford, Relational Contracts and the New Formalism, 2004 WIS. L.
REV. 631, 638.
35. See Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L.
REV. 1641, 1650 (2003) [hereinafter Scott, Indefinite Agreements]. On relational contracts see
Goetz & Scott, supra note 31, at 1115-16; Robert E. Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in Long-
Term Contracts, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 2005, 2039-42 (1987); Oliver E. Williamson, Assessing
Contract, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 177, 183 (1985).
36. On informal enforcement, see generally Benjamin Klein, Why Hold-Ups Occur: The
Self-Enforcing Range of Contractual Relationships, 34 ECON. INQUIRY 444 (1996) (explaining
that changing market conditions can prevent parties from privately enforcing their own
contracts).
37. Posner, supra note 1, at 1583 (“Deliberate ambiguity may be a necessary condition of
making the contract.”). 
38. See id. at 1583-84.
39. See Scott & Triantis, supra note 1, at 816 & n.4; see also Eric A. Posner, Economic
Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 857
(2003) (“[I]nvestment is not verifiable by a court, so the parties gain nothing by putting the
optimal investment in the contract.”); Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An
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these costs, contracts are inevitably somewhat incomplete, with
some terms vague and others absent.40
Contracts scholars have lately supplemented this account by
recognizing that contract specificity can constitute a choice delega-
tion mechanism.41 The degree of contractual completeness is an
effort by the parties to regulate when and by whom their contractual
content will be determined.42 As Robert Scott and George Triantis
write, “[T]he choice between precise terms and vague terms thus
reduces to who chooses [responsibilities] and when they are chosen:
the parties at the time of contracting or the court at trial.”43 
Vague terms can be tools that parties use when they wish for
someone else—a court—to determine responsibilities in the
future—at adjudication.44 Incomplete contracts can be attractive not
Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 278-79
(1992).
40. Cost is not the only explanation for incompleteness. Choi & Triantis, supra note 1, at
884-85 (explaining vagueness as a screen for type); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner,
Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or “The Economics of Boilerplate”),
83 VA. L. REV. 713 (1997) (signaling); Kathryn E. Spier, Incomplete Contracts and Signalling,
23 RAND J. ECON. 432 (1992) (signaling the principal’s type); Triantis, supra note 27, at 1067
(explaining vagueness as a result of agency problems).
41. See Choi & Triantis, supra note 1, at 852; Gilson et al., supra note 1, at 454 (“Thus,
by using soft terms, parties delegate the specification of performance requirements to a court
at the back end of the contracting process.... Alternatively, when the parties agree to precise
(hard) terms ... they withdraw authority from courts to determine their particular per-
formance obligations and instead direct enforcement of the obligations specified in advance.”);
Kraus & Scott, supra note 1; Posner, supra note 1; Scott & Triantis, supra note 1.
42. This perspective resembles the rule/standard distinction in administrative law
literature. For example, Kaplow’s definitive treatment of rules and standards begins with the
assumption that “the only distinction between rules and standards is the extent to which
efforts to give content to the law are undertaken before or after individuals act.” Louis
Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 560 (1992)
(footnote omitted). Many recent articles have noted the similarities between the choices
contracting parties face in drafting terms and the choices of lawmakers crafting public law.
See, e.g., Posner, supra note 1, at 1586; Scott & Triantis, supra note 1, at 820. Like an
administrative agency crafting detailed regulations, precise contract terms leave little for
either judicial misinterpretation or judicial supplement if the future renders the old language
inefficient. But a broadly written administrative standard, like a vague contract term, leaves
the parties uncertain about their duties until a court later specifies it. 
43. Scott & Triantis, supra note 1, at 818. Note that in this passage, Scott & Triantis
actually refer to evidentiary proxy selection, which, for the purposes engaged by this Article,
amounts to the same thing as responsibility determination. 
44. Kraus & Scott, supra note 1, at 1030 (“By framing their agreement in vague terms,
the parties embed their legal obligations in broad standards that delegate discretion to courts
ex post.”). 
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just because they reduce drafting and negotiation costs, but also
because some questions are better answered in the future with the
benefit of hindsight.45 
In addition to calibrating when duties will be specified, contrac-
tual completeness dictates by whom they will be specified. Specific
terms, such as “3 lb. widget,” make the parties the deciders of
contractual responsibility, whereas vague terms, such as “mer-
chantable widget,” leave specification to a court. Courts bring a
distinctively judicial approach to specifying contracts, with its own
advantages and disadvantages.46 
Importantly, although contracts as a whole mix vague and precise
terms, individual terms present the parties with a dichotomous
choice. “In selecting a chooser, therefore, the parties have only two
options: The choice of proxies will be made either at the time of the
contract by the parties, who enjoy private information, or after the
resolution of uncertainty by the court, which enjoys the benefit of
hindsight.”47
Thus, parties decide ex ante at contract formation or adjudicators
decide ex post in adjudication.48 Formally, no third choice exists.
Using this dichotomy, Richard Posner provides a formal model of
contracting costs as the sum of ex ante drafting and ex post
enforcement costs and would explain the degree of contractual
completeness as a function of cost savings on drafting.49 Scott and
Triantis have a similar approach.50
45. Id.
46. The parties likely observe far more than a court can verify, both about their values
and the transaction itself, but courts can compel evidence. The parties are also likely to draft
to maximize joint surplus, whereas courts may choose another interpretive methodology. Alan
Schwartz & Joel Watson, Conceptualizing Contractual Interpretation, 42 J. LEGAL STUD. 1,
5-6 (2013) (explaining that courts maximize accuracy at the expense of welfare); see Schwartz
& Scott, supra note 1, at 549, 602-03.
47. Scott & Triantis, supra note 1, at 841 (emphasis added).
48. Some may prefer to reserve the term “contracting” for the ex ante moment of contract
formation. By contrast, I understand contract writing and contract adjudication to be two
phases of the general category of contracting, by which I mean the determination of
contractual responsibilities.
49. Posner, supra note 1, at 1583-84. 
50. Scott & Triantis, supra note 1, at 817 (“Indeed, the mix of precise and vague terms
that characterize the typical commercial contract can be framed as the product of a tradeoff
that the parties have made in investing in the front end or back end of the contracting
process, based on their particular circumstances .... [Thus], for any given expenditure of
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ex ante
ex tempore
ex post
B. Ex Tempore Contracting
Yet it is clear that parties have three choices, not two, on each
axis of contract specification. A contract can specify duties exten-
sively at contract formation, or it can await determination until
some subsequent litigation. But the parties can also determine
duties on an ongoing basis. For example, the parties could stipulate
that an expert committee will determine the contractual meaning
of “workmanlike” on a real-time basis. 
Likewise, in addition to varying the moment of contractual
determination, the parties have several choices as to the identity of
the contract-specifying agent. If the parties negotiate and record
their agreement in advance, then they have themselves determined
the responsibility. If they leave the term vague or absent, they leave
it to a court. But when they provide that a third party may act to
update their contract, they enlist that agent as an author of their
contract. Thus, as Table 1 displays, there are three, not two,
relevant pairings.51
Table 1
Modes of Contracting
Timing of Determination
Contract formation Interim AfterPerformance
Identity of 
Determining
Actor
Parties
Agent
Court
contracting costs, the parties can reach the highest possible incentive gains by optimizing the
allocation of their investment between the front and back ends.”).
51. There are nine possible combinations. Table 3 speculates as to the sort of contract that
takes place in the various boxes, and Table 4 describes the contractual language used to
achieve it. Still, it is useful to identify these three important pairings, if only for the frequent
elision of ex tempore into other categories. 
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Ex tempore contracting is a conceptually important pairing of
selections as to the timing of determination and the identity of the 
determining actor. Parties utilize it when it suits their ends better
than their other options. It is tautological that parties would
rationally utilize ex tempore contracting to the extent, and in the
instances in which, it costs less than the comparable ex ante and ex
post contracting options. The following analysis seeks to further
interrogate the conditions in which ex tempore contracting is
appropriate.52
Because parties utilizing ex tempore contracting make two
choices, one must consider what drives each of those choices. That
is, when is interim determination preferable to some other timing
of determination, and when is agent determination better than
party or court determination?
1. Timing of Choice
One factor that militates against front-end contracting is
transaction costs: if it is too costly for the parties to agree, perhaps
because there are numerous parties involved, then they may
proceed without coming to full agreement.53 Yet the distinctive
feature that makes parties turn from front-end contracting is surely
uncertainty. When it is impossible or costly to contemplate a
rational allocation of responsibilities in the future, parties defer
determination.54 Uncertainty can emerge in long-term contracts,
transactions with extremely unpredictable outcomes, or contracts in
which the parties’ ultimate goal is not clear, such as firms collabo-
rating to discover commercial applications of their research.55 In
52. As a background assumption, ex ante, ex tempore, and ex post contracting all exist as
between separate contracting agents. When contracting costs are too high, parties can
vertically integrate and impose an internal governance structure. See R. H. Coase, The Nature
of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 388 (1937) (explaining that the firm and the market are
“alternative methods of co-ordinating production”); Oliver E. Williamson, The Vertical
Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 112 (1971). In
that case, the employer or owner essentially defines the content of employee or subsidiaries’
responsibilities on an ongoing basis.
53. See infra note 209 and accompanying text.
54. See infra notes 78-83, 223-25 and accompanying text. 
55. See generally Gilson et al., supra note 1 (providing a theoretical framework to explain
how such firms contract by using both explicit and implicit terms that respond to inherent
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such cases parties can defer to back-end determination, through
absent or vague terms, or they can utilize ex tempore contracting for
ongoing determination.
It is sometimes costly to wait for determination, and in these
cases, ex tempore contracting may prove useful. Because interim
determination allows parties to know their obligations at or around
performance, ex tempore contracting is attractive when parties
place special value on determination prior to or around perfor-
mance. 
When back-end determination is costly, because courts must
exhume degraded evidence and vet conflicting witness testimony, it
may be cheaper to resolve disputes closer to the time of perfor-
mance.56 But the parties will not incur costly litigation expenses if
they can settle their claims in the shadow of adjudication. So
transaction costs emerge again as a major driver of ex post contract-
ing costs. Interim determination will prove attractive when
coordination for renegotiation or settlement is difficult or costly, and
therefore parties more fully bear the brutal costs of adjudication.57
Projects with many parties may pose complex coordination prob-
lems.58 Likewise, projects for which time is precious increase the
cost of patiently coordinating those parties.59 
Clarity of obligation at performance is of great value when courts
are unlikely to award full compensation for breach. If a party can
avoid paying the appropriate damages subsequent to determination
of breach of a once-unclear duty, she will be less likely to efficiently
perform and her counterparty will rationally underinvest in reliance
on that performance. By contrast, parties with clear responsibilities
at the time of performance may be more likely to efficiently perform,
if only because courts are less likely to balk at optimal damages in
the case of such willful breach.60 
In complex and innovative contracting settings, ongoing determi-
nation may serve a role in helping the parties to detect and reinforce
their degree of mutual trust and commitment. Periodic exchange of
uncertainties about the product to be produced).
56. See infra notes 104-12, 227 and accompanying text.
57. See infra notes 113-20, 240 and accompanying text.
58. See infra notes 114-20 and accompanying text.
59. See infra notes 119-24, 230 and accompanying text. 
60. See infra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
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information and tests of good faith are crucial in such contexts.61 A
prompt determination can help clear the air where there is doubt,
or allow a party to validate its worries by addressing exploitative
behavior.62 
The foregoing constitute benefits the parties enjoy vis-à-vis one
another, but clarity of obligation can also benefit the parties in their
dealings with others. A prompt determination can be useful in
establishing one’s contractual fidelity to others.63 
Interim contracting provides parties with clarity of obligation
after contract formation, saving the cost of drafting a contract fit for
any possible future. But it can allow determination of responsibili-
ties even when subsequent coordination of parties is costly and
when obligational clarity is valuable at the time of performance,
such as when courts are unlikely to provide full remedies or when
there is independent value to that clarity. 
2. Identity of Chooser
Merely opting for real-time determination does not place the
parties in the realm of ex tempore contracting, because courts and
parties can determine responsibilities in the interim position.
Courts can issue preliminary injunctions and declaratory judgments
prior to performance. The parties are of course free to renegotiate or
clarify their contract at any time, specifying duties to whatever form
suits them in changing circumstances. Continual negotiation and
accommodation in incomplete contracts is the signature element in
“relational contracting.”64 Yet there are distinct advantages to
selecting a third-party agent. As with analysis of timing, it makes
sense to locate the factors that drive parties to choose one of two
well-known options rather than the other and then evaluate agent
61. See Ronald J. Gilson et al., Contract and Innovation: The Limited Role of Generalist
Courts in the Evolution of Novel Contractual Forms, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 170, 187, 196 (2013);
Gilson et al., supra note 1, at 476-79.
62. See infra note 149 and accompanying text.
63. See infra notes 188, 229-30 and accompanying text.
64. See infra notes 72-74 and accompanying text; see also Donald J. Smythe, Bounded
Rationality, the Doctrine of Impracticability, and the Governance of Relational Contracting,
13 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 227, 230 (2004) (“A relational contract may be defined as an
agreement of an ongoing nature between two or more parties that is typically adapted to
changing circumstances and unique situations as they arise.”) (footnote omitted).
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determination in that context. Two factors may lead parties to avoid
judicial determination. 
First, though state-run courts can make interim determinations,
their determination timing cannot be predicted or controlled. There
is no mechanism for parties to stipulate deadlines for courts, nor
could many courts accommodate requests for timeliness given the
existing docket backload.65 Before final judgment, courts can issue
preliminary injuctions, but they are averse to doing so.66 Second,
generalist courts may lack expertise, increasing error and proof
costs.67 Such courts may bring interpretive methodology incompati-
ble with the parties’ preferences.68 When error and proof costs are
high, when parties are loath to submit to the court’s preferred
methodology, and when they want to ensure interim determination,
they may opt out of court determination. Party determination, when
possible, is clearly more likely to suit the parties’ joint intention.
And by selecting their agent carefully, the parties can select an
expert with the interpretive methodology they most prefer.69 
Party determination may yet be unattractive when transaction
costs are high.70 After all, the parties are not a single actor with a
common interest.71 When discussing contractual responsibilities in
the interim position, each party may be tempted to expropriate
65. Karen Weise, U.S. Courts Face Backlogs and Layoffs, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK
(Apr. 28, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/11_19/b4227024878939.htm
(describing insufficiency of judicial resources to meet demand).
66. See, e.g., Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 925 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“[E]ven though a plaintiff may often prefer a judicial order enjoining a harmful act or
omission before it occurs, damages after the fact are considered an ‘adequate remedy’ in all
but the most extraordinary cases.”).
67. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 1, at 615; Schwartz & Watson, supra note 46, at 22.
68. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 1, at 570-71, 573; Schwartz & Watson, supra note 46,
at 5. Expert arbitrators may offer the parties the interpretive methodology they prefer, as well
as deep industry expertise, though they surely lag behind the parties’ knowledge of the
particular transaction. In contrast, some ex tempore institutions know almost as much as the
parties themselves. See infra Part II.A.2.
69. See infra notes 151-58 and accompanying text. 
70. See infra notes 113-20, 209, 310-14 and accompanying text.
71. This analysis discusses joint determination, but the parties may instead allocate
discretion to just one party, as in an output contract that gives the seller all the power to
determine the quantity. The empowered party gains the ability to exploit any investment by
the disempowered party, requiring governance mechanisms to prevent expropriation. See
VICTOR GOLDBERG, FRAMING CONTRACT LAW 91-141 (2006) (discussing good faith in long-term
contracts). 
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value by driving a hard bargain, concealing asymmetrically held
information, or otherwise holding out.
Norms of reciprocity, community reputation, and the like
sometimes facilitate relational contracts.72 When relationships are
sufficiently long lived, the parties can also construct governance
mechanisms to support cooperation.73 These systems share informa-
tion, create symmetric relationship-specific investments, and
provide internal and bilateral dispute resolution systems.74 The use
of such an agent may be attractive relative to party-driven gover-
nance when transaction costs remain high for the latter, such as
when a large number of parties must coordinate75 or when the cost
of using party agents to run the mechanism is higher than hiring an
expert.76 Agent determination may also be attractive when the
third-party reputational effects of the governance institution are
more credibly conveyed by a third party’s determination.77 This may
be a setting in which reputational signals are noisy.
72. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 31, at 1092-93; Scott, Indefinite Agreements, supra note
35, at 1644-46; Scott & Triantis, supra note 1, at 844 n.78; Williamson, supra note 35, at 197.
73. Ronald J. Gilson et al., Braiding: The Interaction of Formal and Informal Contracting
in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1377, 1379 (2010); Iva Bozovic & Gillian
K. Hadfield, Scaffolding: Using Formal Contracts to Build Informal Relations in Support of
Innovation (Jan. 21, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol
3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1984915.
74. See Gilson et al., supra note 1, at 435 (“The explicit and implicit obligations interact
within a formal governance structure that regulates the exchange of highly revealing
information.... This braiding creates an interactive process that constrains opportunism as
the parties’ investments in detailed knowledge of each other’s character and capabilities raise
switching costs—the costs one party to a contract must incur in order to replace the other
party to the contract.”).
75. See infra notes 191-94 and accompanying text. To be sure, Gilson and his coauthors
describe cases in which a number of parties collectively agree upon contract change and
interpretation. See, e.g., Gilson et al., supra note 1, at 458-71. Such mechanisms may be
effective in the design of aircraft, when all parties are sufficiently informed and invested to
care about making informed changes to the contract, see id. at 450, but there is no reason to
expect the same dynamics generally. Contractual structure also matters. In construction, the
general contractor hires subcontractors who depend upon her for continued business. They
may be likely to side with the contractor in contractor-owner disputes, rendering it more
difficult in construction than in research contracts to leverage the many party perspectives
to make decisions and resolve important disagreements. 
76. See infra note 189 and accompanying text. Note, however, that the agent can create
its own costs, such as a fee. See infra note 176 and accompanying text. 
77. See infra note 188 and accompanying text. 
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Interim contracting is attractive when error and proof costs are
high for generalist adjudicators who lack expertise or depart from
the parties’ preferred interpretive methodology and when party-
centered governance mechanisms cannot cheaply secure agreement.
Table 2 summarizes the conditions for interim contracting use.
Table 2
Ex Ante Ex Tempore Ex Post
Uncertainty Low High High
Transaction
Costs Low High Low
Duration Low High High
Clarity at
Performance
Value
High High Low
Litigation
Costs High High Low
The following Sections go on to demonstrate these observations
about ex tempore contracting. Part III concretizes these observa-
tions and validates their applicability through two examples of
settings of ex tempore contracting that largely conform to these
relevant features.
II. LOCATING EX TEMPORE CONTRACTING 
A. Construction
1. Ex Ante / Ex Post
Construction contracting is characterized by high ex ante and ex
post contracting costs. It is not feasible for parties to draft complete
contracts at contract formation because of the uncertainty involved
in large projects and transactions costs. Yet, judicial intervention is
costly, error prone, and difficult. Transaction costs are often too high
for parties to avoid litigation through settlement, and performance
of disputed responsibilities may be inefficient until clarified.
Many factors raise the cost of ex ante contractual completeness
in construction. Most important must be uncertainty about the
variety of potential problems, with resultantly high variance in cost.
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Who could predict that a golden eagle nest might be found on the
construction site,78 necessitating a delay to obtain a permit to move
the bird?79 It is difficult for parties to decide in advance what shall
be done if a given animal is found,80 who shall have responsibility to
obtain the permit,81 and who shall bear the costs of consequent
delays.82 Problems and surprises multiply once contractors open up
the ground.83 With such variation of problems, the appropriate
resolution may be better handled at or after its discovery, rather
than as a hypothetical contemplated years prior.
Complex contracts are also at odds with the construction indus-
try’s emphasis on standard form contracts.84 The typical construc-
tion project buyer has never before commissioned a project.85 These
inexpert parties rationally choose to rely on industry standard
78. SR 25/US 27 - Recovery of Idle Equipment & Mobilization Costs (Fla. Dep’t of Transp.
Sept. 18, 2011) (recommendation), available at http://www.dot.state.fl.us/Construction/
CONSTADM/drb/decisions/D1/2011/T1328_197706-1_SR25-US27_RecoveryOfIdle
EquipmentAndMobilizationCosts.pdf.
79. Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, 50 C.F.R. §§ 22.3, 22.26 (2012).
80. Should a contractual eagle clause include other endangered bird finds? See SR 60
(Osceola Blvd) - Added Time for Caracara Bird Suspension, Extra Work Asphalt Rutting &
Mitered End Section (Fla. Dep’t of Transp. May 28, 2008) (recommendation), available at
http://www.dot.state.fl.us/construction/CONSTADM/drb/decisions/D4/2008/D4FPN228596
SR60OsceolaBlvd.pdf.
81. Cf. I-75 & Alico Rd. Interchange - Water Use Permit Responsibility (Fla. Dep’t of
Transp. Dec. 20, 2005) (recommendation), available at http://www.dot.state.fl.us/construction/
CONSTADM/drb/decisions/D1/2007/D1I-75&AlicoRdInterchangeWaterUsePermit.pdf
(discussing a dispute as to which party is responsible for obtaining a dewatering permit).
82. After a nineteen-day pause to obtain the permit, the weather became too cold for
construction work, resulting in a delay for several months. Projects typically penalize
contractors for weather delays, but should eagle-preceded weather delays be treated
differently? See SR 25/US 27 - Recovery of Idle Equipment & Mobilization Costs, supra note
78.
83. See, e.g., Marine Industrial Park Tunnel Case History, supra note 6, at 19 (noting that
one contract to move an estimated 10,000 tons of excavated materials subsequently required
the contractor to move 85,000 tons); see also Klein & Gulati, supra note 25, at 174
(“[C]onstruction planning prior to groundbreaking is characterized by considerable difficulty
of specification.”).
84. Surajeet Chakravarty & W. Bentley MacLeod, Contracting in the Shadow of the Law,
40 RAND J. ECON. 533, 554 (2009) (“[T]he form construction contracts sold by the American
Institute of Architects … and contracts quite similar to them in form[ ] are widely used in the
construction industry to allocate billions of dollars of resources.”). Standardized contracts are
to be expected when many parties execute largely similar transactions. See Gilson et al., supra
note 61, at 176-77.
85. Stipanowich, supra note 7, at 477 (“The typical construction buyer is someone who has
never built capital construction before.”).
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terms rather than take risks in drafting their own terms. Others,
such as a state transportation authority, may frequently procure
works but opt for form contracts in order to constrain their negotiat-
ing agents.86 Standard contracts facilitate the use of open bidding,
which may engender citizen confidence in the contracting process.87
The public tendency towards form contracts creates network
externalities in favor of private adoption.88
Though standard form contracts can economize on otherwise
daunting coordination and drafting costs, they will usually be cast
at a higher level of generality than a bespoke contract would.89
Construction projects are bespoke products with commodity
contracts. Failing to particularize the terms ex ante implicitly leaves
that task to someone else—very often a court ex post.90
Relatively complete contracts are possible under uncertainty and
with relatively general contracts only if risks are allocated in broad
strokes, but such contracts may result in bad incentives.91 All cost
risks—eagle removal included—could be assigned to the contractor,
making the contractor’s bid an “all-in” price.92 Fixed prices, however,
tend to be unsatisfactory in long-term contracts, when changing
circumstances can create a divergence between cost and bid.93 Fear
86. See Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 627, 631
(2002) (explaining that firms constrain agents by binding them to unwaivable terms in a form
contract).
87. See Donavan Bezer, The Inadequacy of Surety Bid Bonds in Public Construction
Contracting, 40 PUB. CONT. L.J. 87, 91 (2010) (“[B]ids are opened publicly to instill public
confidence in the bidding process.”).
88. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 40, at 716, 725-27; cf. Philip L. Bruner, The
Historical Emergence of Construction Law, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1, 8 (2007) (discussing
the enactment of competitive bidding laws).
89. See Karen Eggleston et al., The Design and Interpretation of Contracts: Why
Complexity Matters, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 91, 112-13 (2000) (explaining that forms tend towards
simplicity).
90. See Daniel Markovits, Arbitration’s Arbitrage: Social Solidarity at the Nexus of
Adjudication and Contract, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 431, 477-78 (2010) (arguing that arbitration
clauses are especially useful in contracts of adhesion precisely because of the need to
determine boilerplates’ meaning for parties’ transactions). 
91. See OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 15-17 (1995).
92. This is the default at common law. See JUSTIN SWEET & MARC M. SCHNEIER, LEGAL
ASPECTS OF ARCHITECTURE, ENGINEERING AND THE CONSTRUCTION PROCESS § 14.02, at 349
(9th ed. 2013).
93. Oliver E. Williamson, Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies—In General and
with Respect to CATV, 7 BELL J. ECON. 73, 82 (1976).
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of such divergence may encourage excessive pre-bid research,
particularly if contractors are at all risk averse.94 
Alternatively, a cost-plus contract assigns all risks to the owner.95
Yet, in the context of asymmetric information, cost-plus contracts
pose serious agency costs. A contractor may not pursue the best
price for supplies because she is spending the owner’s money.
Suppliers—employees or other sellers—may reward her in subse-
quent fixed-price contracts for being generous with cost-plus
contracts. Worse yet, if her “plus” is a percentage of the total cost,
then she has an incentive to increase costs in order to increase her
payment.96
It is therefore unsurprising that construction contracts routinely
leave unaddressed the resolution of some of the most common
potential disputes. Consider some terms within the FIDIC Red Book
contract, which is the predominant form contract for international
construction projects.97 The Red Book assigns duties through many
quintessential vague contract terms, such as a requirement of
94. Suppose that a project’s costs vary between 0 and 1. Every contractor’s bid in an
auction for the project should be 0.5. Now imagine that the contractor can invest r in order
to know the project’s cost prior to bidding. If research reveals the project’s cost to be less than
0.5, the contractor can bid 0.5 - e, winning the auction. Her expected surplus in those cases
is 0.75 - 0.5 - e or 0.25 - e and is never negative. That occurs half of the time. The other half
of the time, the project would cost more than 0.5, and she does not bid, and another bidder
takes the project at 0.5. The contractor’s payoff is thus 0.5(0.75 - 0.5 - e) + 0.5(0) - r = 0.125 -
e - r. A rational contractor will thus invest r up to 0.125 in order to know the project’s cost. 
This is a type of “fishing problem.” One solution is for the owner to research costs herself
and then share the answers with all bidders. But the contractors’ bids will reflect their
distrust of the owner’s proffer. See Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information,
and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1978). Moreover, for some projects, any amount
of cost investigation—even if credible and nonduplicative—is excessive. If the range of cost
possibilities all lie below the level of benefit the project generates, the owner will want to
pursue the project without any research.
95. Lump-sum contracts with a cost-plus component are said to be “virtually unknown in
the design and construction field.” Eggleston et al., supra note 89, at 95. 
96. Cost-plus contracts also frustrate owners’ preference for competitive bidding. Owners
would like to be able to select the cheapest bid for comparable services, and with fixed prices
that is a simple matter. With cost-plus, owners can look at the “plus” but cannot compare
overall price without forming opinions about the contractors’ various—and likely
different—costs.
97. See Christopher R. Seppala, The New FIDIC International Civil Engineering
Subcontract, CONSTRUCTION LAW., Aug. 1995, at 25, 25; Gabriel Swiney, The Dubious
Upgrade of International Development Contracts, 3 BYU INT’L L. & MGMT. REV. 145, 147
(2007).
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“proper workmanlike and careful manner” of execution, with
“recognised good practice.”98 
Beyond being just vague, construction contracts may include
conscious gaps. Red Book section 4.12 provides that the contractor
is entitled to extension of time and payments of additional costs
arising out of adverse physical conditions that are “unforeseeable.”99
The FIDIC Guidebook then provides that an event is (i) unforesee-
able if it happens less often than once every ten years, and (ii)
foreseeable if it happens more often than once every six years.100
The official guidance is silent on events happening between six and
ten years frequency, leaving a gap for delays more frequent than the
national census but less frequent than a senatorial reelection.
Suppose Hurricane Wilma disrupts and delays construction101 in an
area in which hurricanes occur every seven years.102 Is the contrac-
tor due additional compensation for managing it? Or is this just one
of those foreseeable risks contractors are meant to manage at their
own cost? The contract is silent as to responsibility.
The guidance makes debatably unforeseeable circumstances quite
frequent. If a given problem occurs every six years, then a given
three-year project has nearly a 50 percent chance of experiencing it.
Presuming that there are a large number of potentially unforesee-
able adverse physical conditions, it is overwhelmingly likely that a
contractor will have reason to make a claim. It becomes not a
question of whether, but rather of how often, a contractor will make
claims and whether the owner will agree that the problem was a
fluke. “Reasonable foreseeability” is unsurprisingly the heart of
many construction disputes.103
98. FDIC CONDITIONS OF CONTRACT FOR CONSTRUCTION § 7.1(b), at 24 (1999).
99. Id. § 4.12, at 16-17.
100. FIDIC GUIDEBOOK (defining “reasonably foreseeable”). Unforeseeable is defined in
sub-clause 1.1.6.8 as “not reasonably foreseeable by an experienced contractor by the date for
submission of the Tender.” Id.
101. See I-95 (SR 9) Payment & Time for Hurricane Wilma & Tropical Storm Gamma (Fla.
Dep’t of Transp. June 19, 2006) (recommendation), available at http://www.dot.state.fl.us/
construction/CONSTADM/drb/decisions/D4/03Thru06/T4016_231918-2_SR9_I95_
P3_HurricaneWilmaPaymentExtension_061906.pdf.
102. See Barry D. Keim & Robert A. Muller, Spatiotemporal Patterns and Return Periods
of Tropical Storm and Hurricane Strikes from Texas to Maine, 20 J. CLIMATE 3498, 3506
(2007) (citing a study finding that Palm Beach has a hurricane return frequency of seven
years).
103. MICHAEL D. ROBINSON, A CONTRACTOR’S GUIDE TO THE FIDIC CONDITIONS OF
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Though parties extensively use courts to determine their
contractual duties, ex post contracting is costly in construction. In
litigation, proof costs are high and errors may be frequent.104
Though the parties may be able to observe quality of performance,105
a court must look to noisy or costly proxies, such as testimony from
witnesses who may not remember the state of the site at a particu-
lar time in the past.106 Yet with the stakes high, parties may be
willing to expend substantial resources on adjudication.107
The resultant litigation costs are staggering. Estimates of annual
dispute resolution costs in the U.S. construction industry begin at
$4 billion and rise as high as $12 billion.108 Anecdotal evidence from
Australia suggests that almost 50 percent of all legal costs in
construction are connected with disputes.109 In nearly one-tenth of
all projects, 8-10 percent of total project costs are legal costs.110 At
any moment, “one-third of practicing architects are involved in
litigation.”111 Construction has earned its reputation for litigious-
ness.112
CONTRACT 24 (2011). Similar terms give rise to litigation in domestic construction contracts.
See, e.g., Kiewit-Atkinson-Kenny v. Mass. Water Res. Auth., No. 01-1920 BLS, 2002 WL
311876911, at *4 (Mass. Super. Ct. Sep. 2, 2002) (discussing whether contractor’s increased
costs were due to differing site conditions warranting an equitable adjustment).
104. See Scott & Triantis, supra note 1, at 816 n.4; see also Kiewit-Atkinson-Kenny, 2002
WL 311876911, at *33 (“The contract language, however, is sprawled over hundreds of pages
and contained in several documents, not all speaking consistently with one another; and the
‘record’ is massive, covering literally thousands of pages. The burden placed upon this Court
is immense.”).
105. AVINASH K. DIXIT, LAWLESSNESS AND ECONOMICS 26-27 (2004). As with perishable
goods, see Eggleston et al., supra note 89, at 119-20, the court may be unable to verify the flux
of the construction site.
106. Litigation is often delayed because of contractual clauses requiring late adjudication,
because of a desire to economize on proceedings, because defects become evident only near to
or after completion, or out of parties’ hope early on that they can salvage the relationship
without hostile lawsuits.
107. THOMAS E. WILLGING & EMERY G. LEE III, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., IN THEIR WORDS:
ATTORNEY VIEWS ABOUT COSTS AND PROCEDURES IN FEDERAL CIVIL LITIGATION 5 (2010),
available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/costciv3.pdf/$file/costciv3.pdf.
108. REDUCING CONSTRUCTION COSTS, supra note 4, at 1.
109. Peter H.J. Chapman, Dispute Boards for Major Infrastructure Projects (Nov. 2011)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.peterhjchapman.com/peterhjchapman/
Dispute_Resolution_Board.html. This figure may be unsurprising, given the definition of
“reasonable foreseeability” in contracts. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text. 
110. Chapman, supra note 109, at 5-6.
111. Stipanowich, supra note 7, at 476 (citations omitted).
112. See, e.g., BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, MORE CONSTRUCTION FOR THE MONEY 13 (1983),
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Incomplete contracting need not lead to costly disputes if parties
can cheaply resolve disagreements, specify vague terms, and settle
claims,113 but overall transaction costs may still be too high. Coordi-
nation is costly due to the multi-party nature of the construction
project, which has been called the “legal Achilles heel of the con-
struction process.”114 Since the nineteenth century, the historical
responsibilities of the “master builder” have devolved into a plethora
of separate functions.115 These separate functions have in turn been
performed by a variety of separate firms.116
For large projects, these many parties will inevitably represent
many jurisdictions with accordingly different expectations.117
Relational contracting may be less effective because most parties
will not work together again and will communicate with one another
only through the general contractor.118 Holdout problems may be
exacerbated by the granting of a mechanic’s lien, a security interest
with the power to compel auction in order to recover fees, to anyone
who contributes to the construction of a building.119 The risk of
available at http://www.ce.berkeley.edu/~tommelein/BRTMoreConstructionForTheMoney.pdf
(“The bottom line of this adversarial dance is a constant state of confrontation.”); Build to
Suit?, CONSTRUCTION DIMENSIONS, June 1989, at 13, 13 (lamenting the “awful litigious nature
of this industry”).
113. See, e.g., Scott & Triantis, supra note 1, at 819; accord Kathryn E. Spier, Economics
of Litigation, in 5 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 162, 162 (Steven N. Durlauf
& Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008) (“[L]itigation costs … represent a deadweight loss.
Any out-of-court transfer … from the defendant to the plaintiff would be a Pareto
improvement.”).
114. SWEET & SCHNEIER, supra note 92, § 23.01, at 644.
115. 1 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 26, § 1:2 n.1 (discussing the fragmented nature of
the industry).
116. John W. Hinchey, Visions for the Next Millenium, in 1 ROBERT F. CUSHMAN & JAMES
J. MYERS, CONSTRUCTION LAW HANDBOOK § 2.01[A], at 32 (1999) (calling the construction
industry “exceptionally fragmented”).
117. Bryan M. Seifert, International Construction Dispute Adjudication Under
International Federation of Consulting Engineers Conditions of Contract and the Dispute
Adjudication Board, 131 J. PROF. ISSUES ENGINEERING EDUC. & PRAC. 149, 150 (2005).
118. See Stipanowich, supra note 7, at 473 n.27 (describing the construction industry as
“fragmented, consisting primarily of relatively small contractors operating on a local or
regional basis”); see also Blake Constr. Co. v. C. J. Coakley Co., 431 A.2d 569, 575 (D.C. 1981)
(“We note ... that, except in the middle of a battlefield, nowhere must men coordinate the
movement of other men and all materials in the midst of such chaos and with such limited
certainty of present facts and future occurrences as in a huge construction project.”).
119. See Blake Nelson, Construction Liens: A National Review and Template for a Uniform
Lien Act, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 245, 246 (2007).
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endangering the project may be a small subcontractor’s best chance
at getting paid in full.120 
Disagreements as to entitlements can lead to inefficient perfor-
mance. Project completion can be substantially delayed, and
equipment and workers wastefully idled, due to the difficulty of
coordinating agreement among the many subcontractors and related
parties. In the interest of keeping the project moving, most construc-
tion projects assign some provisional control over performance to the
project architect so that she can order performance even before
renegotiation.121 We might characterize this as one form of a party-
driven governance mechanism, assigning the owner’s agent the
power to make contract determinations in the moment. This can
help overcome wasteful holdout problems, but it brings its own
problems. 
The contractor will have little bargaining power to demand
payment later on because she cannot retrieve the compelled effort
and materials invested in the project.122 She may elect a form of
reluctant or low-quality performance,123 leading even an honest
owner to retaliate against perceived shirking. Asymmetric informa-
tion can exacerbate this cycle of distrust.124 Even if litigation later
clarifies contractual duties in this case, losses mount in the
meantime. 
Parties value clarity of obligation at the time of performance
because courts do not always provide adequate damages for breach,
and therefore the shadow of litigation may not provide optimal
incentives at the time of performance. Consider Justice (then judge)
120. See Ian Ayres & Kristin Madison, Threatening Inefficient Performance of Injunctions
and Contracts, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 46 & n.1 (1999).
121. See Adrian L. Bastanielli III, The DRB and the New Standard Form Contract
Documents, DISP. RESOL. BOARD FOUND. F., Aug. 2008, at 10, 12. FIDIC and ICE contracts
similarly empower the engineer. See Chapman, supra note 109, at 3.
122. This risk is particularly salient because the architect, who provisionally directs the
work and decides compensation, is paid by the owner and may be perceived as biased by the
contractor. See Christopher R. Seppala, Contractor’s Claims Under the FIDIC International
Civil Engineering Contract, 14 INT’L BUS. LAW. 179, 180 (1986).
123. See GOLDBERG, supra note 71, at 328-29; Keith J. Crocker & Thomas P. Lyon, What
Do “Facilitating Practices” Facilitate? An Empirical Investigation of Most-Favored-Nation
Clauses in Natural Gas Contracts, 37 J.L. & ECON. 297, 303 (1994); Paul L. Joskow, Price
Adjustments in Long-Term Contracts: The Case of Coal, 31 J.L. & ECON. 47, 52 (1988). 
124. See AVINASH K. DIXIT & BARRY J. NALEBUFF, THINKING STRATEGICALLY 106-13 (1991);
DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, LAW’S ORDER 164 (2000).
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Cardozo’s touchstone treatment of substantial performance, Jacob
& Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, in which a contractor used a different brand
of pipe than that specified by the contract, but of similar quality.125
Given the wastefulness of rebuilding the house with the correct
pipe, Cardozo found it would have been “harshness” and “oppres-
sion” to require specific performance126 and suggested that appropri-
ate damages for pipe so similar would be “nominal or nothing.”127
Yet this result blunts performance incentives because contractors
learn that they can ignore low-salience contract provisions.128 Courts
are more willing to impose large awards against those who willfully
breach.129 Such a determination seems more likely when the
breaching party knew unambiguously what duties the contract
assigned.130 Construction is therefore an area in which contractual
clarity at the time of performance lets parties know they stand a
reasonable chance of paying appropriate damages, thus reducing
their incentive for inefficient breach. 
To translate the foregoing into the language of the ex ante / ex
post dichotomy, one finds terms like “reasonably foreseeable” in
construction contracts, despite their contribution toward blunted
incentive and litigation costs, because greater initial specificity
would be unduly costly. The transaction costs and uncertainty are
just too daunting. The court’s hindsight may make it cheaper than
attempting ex ante to agree upon the best allocation of duties for the
uncertain future. Yet litigation costs, incentive costs, and the
transaction costs to avoid them are all high. If those are the parties’
125. 129 N.E. 889, 890 (N.Y. 1921).
126. Id. at 890-91.
127. Id. at 891; cf. Montgomery v. Karavas, 114 P.2d 776, 781-82 (N.M. 1941) (agreeing
with Cardozo’s holding but finding in this case that specific performance would not be “grossly
and unfairly out of proportion to the benefits”).
128. Kent was not a case of a vague term because the parties clearly specified the pipe
brand. Kent, 129 N.E. at 890. 
129. George M. Cohen, The Fault Lines in Contract Damages, 80 VA. L. REV. 1225 (1994);
cf. Kent, 129 N.E. at 890 (finding that contractor’s breach was not willful).
130. Richard Crasswell, When Is a Willful Breach “Willful”? The Link Between Definitions
and Damages, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1501, 1502-04 (2009) (critically examining the factors of
knowledge and intention in willful breach); Patricia H. Marschall, Willfulness: A Crucial
Factor in Choosing Remedies for Breach of Contract, 24 ARIZ. L. REV. 733, 760 (1982) (arguing
that when a breach is knowing and unexcused, courts should grant the aggrieved party “either
specific performance or the highest possible measure of expectation damages”) (footnote
omitted).
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only two options, as the ex ante / ex post dichotomy implies, then
the disputatious present may be a rational equilibrium.
2. Ex Tempore & Dispute Boards
The construction industry had long accepted substantial back-end
costs by way of the logic of the ex ante / ex post dichotomy. Yet
remarkable strides have been made through the use of a new
contracting technology: neutral expert panels called dispute
boards.131 These boards promise a third way of addressing contrac-
tual specification, through ex tempore contracting.
Dispute boards are panels of neutral experts, typically three,
chosen by the parties and convened at the start of a construction
project.132 Thereafter, the board visits frequently during the life of
the construction project, often at least three times per year.133
During their visits they ferret out potential conflicts and budding
disputes even when projects are going well. They write opinions
concerning quality, responsibility, and remedy. These opinions are
contractually binding on the parties, though either party may reject
the board’s decision upon proper notice.134 Board decisions are not
131. European-style boards are often called dispute adjudication boards, contrasted to the
American-style dispute review boards or dispute resolution boards. See Swiney, supra note 97,
at 161.
132. Dispute Resolution Board (DRB), AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, http://www.adr.org/aaa/
faces/services/disputeavoidanceservices/disputeresolutionboards (last visited Mar. 8, 2014).
The typical board has one member selected by the contractor, one by the owner, and a
chairman chosen by the first two members. Board members are not supposed to act as agents
of the nominating party. Id. Genuinely neutral board members may be easier to find at the
start of the contractual relationship, prior to disputes, while the parties are still trying to
establish an efficient working procedure. 
133. CHERN, supra note 5, at 187 (noting that in most contracts, “three site meetings per
year is the minimum”). For example, the Ertan Dam project board in China made more than
twenty site visits. China’s Ertan Hydroelectric Project: A Dispute Resolution Board Case
Study, DISP. RESOL. BOARD FOUND. F., May 2004, at 1, 18, available at http://www.drb.org/
newsletter/Forum05-04FullColor.pdf.
134. The effect of rejection or acceptance varies depending on the clause. In Europe and
internationally the board’s decision is commonly contractually binding though not final. Jesse
B. Grove & Richard Appuhn, Comparative Experience with Dispute Boards in the United
States and Abroad, CONSTRUCTION LAW., Summer 2012, at 6, 8. That is, once the board makes
its recommendation, the parties are contractually bound to act accordingly for now, though
either party may still seek review from a court or adjudicator. The contract, however, will
typically provide that, in the subsequent adjudication, the board’s recommendation will be
admitted as evidence. L.A. Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth. v. Shea-Kiewit-Kenny, 69 Cal. Rptr.
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adjudicatory judgments, subject to execution.135 Rather, the parties
have agreed that an unchallenged opinion board decision becomes
a part of the contract, binding and available in any subsequent
adjudication.136
Formal recommendations are timely, available within a few
weeks of the board’s meeting with the parties, which itself promises
to be at most a few months after conflict arises.137 Boards can make
informal recommendations even faster, perhaps contemporaneously
with their visit to the site.138
Dispute boards exemplify ex tempore contracting because of their
distinctive function in determining contractual responsibilities on
an ongoing basis. Dispute boards allow parties to draft an appar-
ently incomplete contract without suffering for long the ills of
2d 431, 433 (Ct. App. 1997).
In the United States, dispute boards exert less overt influence over the parties because
rejected (and sometimes even accepted) board recommendations may not be provisionally
binding. See Grove & Appuhn, supra note 134, at 8; see, e.g., Sehulster Tunnels/Pre-Con v.
Traylor Bros., Inc./Obayashi Corp., 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 655, 667 (Ct. App. 2003) (“The Prime
Contract provided that either City or TBO could refer a dispute to the DRB, which was
charged with impartially and promptly considering referenced disputes and providing written
nonbinding recommendations to assist their resolution.”). The board decision has teeth in
greater part from its publicity to future adjudication bodies. 
135. The fact that boards lack enforcement powers definitively distinguishes them from ex
post adjudication. Yet the fact that they are willing to assign blame and make substantive
recommendations distinguishes them from ordinary mediation. See Jennifer Gerarda Brown
& Ian Ayres, Economic Rationales for Mediation, 80 VA. L. REV. 323, 324 (1994) (“A mediator,
by contrast, stops short of recommending how the dispute should be resolved.”) (footnote
omitted).
136. Dispute Board Rules, INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, http://www.iccwbo.org/products-
and-services/arbitration-and-adr/dispute-boards/dispute-board-rules/#article_1 (last visited
Mar. 30, 2014) (“Dispute Boards are not arbitral tribunals and their Determinations are not
enforceable like arbitral awards. Rather, the Parties contractually agree to be bound by the
Determinations under certain specific conditions set forth herein.”).
137. See, e.g., SR 559 (over CSX RR) - Differing Subsurface Conditions for End Bent 4,
Shaft No. 1 (Fla. Dep’t of Transp. Jan. 2, 2012) (recommendation), available at http://www.dot.
state.fl.us/construction/CONSTADM/drb/decisions/D1/2012/T1393_197701-4_Differing
Conditions_EndBent4_DrilledShaft1.pdf (showing that the formal board recommendation was
available just thirteen days after the dispute review board hearing).
138. The immediacy of their response seems to be vital to their usefulness. See Cyril Chern,
The Dispute Board Federation and the Role of Dispute Boards in Construction - Benefits
Without Burden, 2010 SPAIN ARB. REV. 5, 9 (“All the other forms of dispute resolution
generally involve a delay whilst the parties fight it out.”); see also Kathleen M. J. Harmon,
Case Study as to the Effectiveness of Dispute Review Boards on the Central Artery/Tunnel
Project, 1 J. LEGAL AFF. & DISP. RESOL. ENGINEERING & CONSTRUCTION 18, 25 (2009) (agreeing
that timely use of DRBs appears to help resolve disputes).
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incompleteness. Yet they need not pay for this obligational clarity
in advance of it being necessary, say, by specifying how precisely a
golden eagle discovery will change the plan. If an eagle is found, the
parties do not have to pause the construction project for protracted
litigation, nor reluctantly continue the project with judicial inter-
vention pending. They need not wait until costly adjudication, nor
perform in the shadow of obligational uncertainty, nor draft
complete contracts ex ante. They can have a dispute board determi-
nation right away. These determinations may be informed by
hindsight, in that they may impose more efficient or desirable
allocations than the parties might have written had they set their
minds to it at contract formation.
The dispute board clause converts seemingly vague terms, such
as “equitable,” “reasonably anticipated,” or “workmanlike quality,”
into interim terms, which have no fixed meaning at drafting but
have a determined meaning around performance, prior to adjudica-
tion. They answer questions like whether an owner has a duty to
mitigate damages, and whether its actions satisfy that duty.139 They
specify duties, as might the parties or a court.140
The parties can provide that the project deadline may be extended
due to unforeseeable delays, but not due to those that are reason-
ably foreseeable.141 They can adopt this drafting strategy, rather
than an ex ante schedule of results for each conceivable cause for
delay and rather than costly ambiguity and litigation, because a
dispute board is available to immediately give content to the
apparently vague clause.142 The contract can excuse delayed
139. See, e.g., SR 70 - Time Extension Due to Shortage of Thermoplastic Material 1, 4-5
(Fla. Dep’t of Transp. Nov. 14, 2010) (recommendation), available at http://www.dot.state.fl.
us/Construction/CONSTADM/drb/decisions/D1/2010/T1341_422403-1_ThermoplasticMaterial
Shortage.pdf.
140. Note that it does not follow that the board’s methodology is that of a party or a court.
Part III.B discusses the many determinative frameworks used by interim agents.
141. See, e.g., Cheryl Semple et al., Construction Claims and Disputes: Causes and
Cost/Time Overruns, 120 J. CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERING & MGMT. 785 (1994); see also
FENIOSKY PEÑA-MORA ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO CONSTRUCTION DISPUTE RESOLUTION 14-15
(2003) (discussing methods of handling internal and external uncertainties in contracts).
142. See, e.g., SR 70 - Time Extension Due to Shortage of Thermoplastic Material, supra
note 139; SR 5A (Nova Rd.) - Area Wide Cement Shortage 2, 4, 16 (Fla. Dep’t of Transp. Nov.
22, 2004) (recommendation), available at http://www.dot.state.fl.us/construction/CONSTADM/
drb/decisions/D5/Dist%205%20SR-5A%20MCS%20Cement%20Shortage%20Impact.pdf
(concerning cement shortage); SR15 (US 441) - Base Material Shortage (Fla. Dep’t of Transp.
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construction when there is an “area-wide shortage” of materials,
leaving the board to specify the geographic and conceptual size of
the “area.”143 The parties need not specify the contractual implica-
tions of an unanticipated conflict between the proposed location of
a project and an existing electrical power line because they can trust
that either they or a neutral third party will update the plan in a
timely fashion.144 
Dispute resolution boards can address countless other contingen-
cies, without anticipating them at contract formation. The parties
can learn whether unexpected changes in port security policies
excuse a contractor from late delivery.145 The parties need not
specify which emergency repairs will entitle the contractor to
additional compensation,146 nor how the contract will apportion the
cost of damage by third parties,147 leaving it to the dispute board to
rapidly evaluate the repairs presented.
The parties can give the owner the right to modify the project as
its needs change, so long as the contractor is reasonably compen-
sated for any additional work or expenses.148 They can do this
Nov. 15, 2004) (recommendation), available at http://www.dot.state.fl.us/construction/
CONSTADM/drb/decisions/D5/40917315201%20Base%20Shortage.pdf (concerning coquina
and limerock shortage).
143. See, e.g., FLA. DEP’T OF TRANSP., STANDARD SPECIFICATIONS FOR ROAD AND BRIDGE
CONSTRUCTION § 8-7.3.2 (2013).
144. See SR 366 - Utility Conflict (Fla. Dep’t of Transp. June 13, 2000) (recommendation),
available at http://www.dot.state.fl.us/construction/CONSTADM/drb/decisions/D3/drb73.pdf.
145. See, e.g., SR 50 & SR 45 - Time Adjustment Due to Delays from Tampa Port Security
(Fla. Dep’t of Transp. Dec. 2, 2003) (recommendation), available at http://www.dot.state.fl.us/
construction/CONSTADM/drb/decisions/D7/D7%20Tampa%20Security%20Delays.pdf.
146. See, e.g., (Apalachicola River Bridge) - Payment for Repair of Expansion Joints (Fla.
Dep’t of Transp. May 10, 2000) (recommendation), available at http://www.dot.state.fl.us/
construction/CONSTADM/drb/decisions/D3/drb74.pdf.
147. See, e.g., I-95 Express Lanes - Third Party Damages, Incident Management, Fuel Spill
Clean-Up, Routine Maintenance (Fla. Dep’t of Transp. Oct. 7, 2012) (recommendation),
available at http://www.dot.state.fl.us/construction/CONSTADM/drb/decisions/D4/12-
13/E4K49_422796-1_I-95_MultipleIssues.pdf; SR 9 (I-95) Payment for Guardrails Damaged
by Third Parties (Fla. Dep’t of Transp. Dec. 22, 2011) (recommendation), available at
http://www.dot.state.fl.us/construction/CONSTADM/drb/decisions/D4/2011/T4190_406870-
1_SR9_I95_RepairsToDamagedGuardrail.pdf.
148. See, e.g., SR 45 (US 41) - Changes to Luminaries (Fla. Dep’t of Transp. Oct. 12, 2008)
(recommendation), available at http://www.dot.state.fl.us/construction/CONSTADM/drb/
decisions/D1/2008/DRB22-ACC27-Luminaires.pdf (discussing owner’s request for more
powerful streetlights); SR 50 & SR 45 - Significant Change in Work (JPA Fittings, Water &
Force Mains) (Fla. Dep’t of Transp. Nov. 7, 2002) (recommendation), available at http://www.
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without extensive ex ante description of what changes will result in
what fees for the contractor, and they can still avoid inefficient
litigation and holdups.149 Likewise, the contract can give the
contractor some ability to initiate changes, like substituting an
alternative infrastructure system for the propriety system men-
tioned in the contract.150 These allowances give long-term contracts
the flexibility they need to remain rational as the world changes. 
Unlike with a court, the parties choose the composition of the
dispute board151 and can use that as an opportunity to select its
interpretative methodology from among the many options. Some
boards exhibit formalist preferences, with the agency attempting to
divine the appropriate determination on the basis of the written
contract.152 Other agents are inclined to evaluate extensive implied
duties. Chern describes one construction contract that required the
use of local labor whenever possible. The contractor alleged an
implied right to have the owner help find local labor and forgive the
obligation to whatever degree the owner was competing with the
contractor by hiring from the same labor pool for other matters.153
There was no textual basis for this claim, but the dispute board
found the question to be a reasonable one.154
In contracts in which relationships matter and formal proceedings
risk crowding out relational cooperation, parties may select a
dispute board that is inclined to help the contractual relationship.
dot.state.fl.us/Construction/CONSTADM/drb/decisions/D7/Dist%207%20SR-50%20Smith%20
Significant%20Change.pdf.
149. Without contractual protection, it may be possible for one party to exploit the other.
Either the contractor will be able to extort a high fee from the owner who will have difficulty
obtaining a competing bid in the course of construction, or the contract may allow the owner
to excessively alter the project without sufficient compensation to the contractor. 
150. See, e.g., SR 5/US 1 - Obligation to Utilize Proprietary Irrigation System Specified
(Fla. Dep’t of Transp. Feb. 16, 1999) (recommendation), available at http://www.dot.state.fl.us/
construction/CONSTADM/drb/decisions/D4/drb37.pdf; see also SR A1A - Acceptance of
Material (Steel Beams) Not in Conformity with Plans & Specs (Fla. Dep’t of Transp. June 24,
1998) (recommendation), available at http://www.dot.state.fl.us/construction/CONSTADM/drb/
decisions/D4/drb110.pdf.
151. See Shani Wallis, DRBs in North America: Knowing and Playing by the Rules, DISP.
RESOL. BOARD FOUND. F., Aug. 2008, at 1, 1.
152. See, e.g., Russel P. Rudden, Assessing 10 Years of Dispute Resolution Boards at BART,
DISP. RESOL. BOARD FOUND. F., Aug. 2004, at 1, 18.
153. CHERN, supra note 5, at 216-19.
154. Id.
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In one dispute, a board determined that the contractor was not
entitled to avoid penalties for its late completion, but the board also
suggested that the department consider allowing thirty to thirty-two
days of additional credit to the contractor.155 Why? “To partner
normally suggest [sic] both parties conceding to somewhere around
mid-point.”156 So the entitlement goes to the owner, but a suggestion
to split the baby also goes in the record. 
Other parties wish for boards to err in favor of the contractor, so
as to encourage other contractors to make quick, low bids. One
Canadian court expressed a government policy to ratify board-
determined awards even when fresh litigation would surely yield a
lower award to the contractor. The court justified the bias by
asserting that it encourages contractors to feel safe in offering
quick, low bids.157 The benefit of so many methodologies is that the
parties have great freedom to select whatever they like, but there is
a risk that one or both parties will fail to appreciate the conse-
quences of selecting a particular board.158
Dispute boards’ effectiveness no doubt comes from many causes
in addition to their role in ex tempore contracting. They may help
parties to mediate emotional disputes.159 Their opinion can serve to
preserve contemporaneous evidence for later judicial verification.160
Periodic board reports help the parties gauge one another’s
commitment to the project.161 But boards are not just mediators or
expert witnesses, though by wearing these hats they may serve an
155. SR-78 (Dike Rd. to Okeechobee Co.) Additional Time (Fla. Dep’t of Transp. Nov. 15,
2003) (recommendation), available at http://www.dot.state.fl.us/construction/CONSTADM/
drb/decisions/D1/PastYears/D1%20SR-78%20Dike%20Rd%20to%20Okeechobee%20Co%20Add
%20Time.pdf.
156. Id.
157. See Welcon (1976) Ltd. v. Town Council of S. River, 2006 CarswellNfld. & P.E.I.R. 199,
para. 4 (Can. Nfld.) (WL) (explaining why the government defers to board decisions), aff ’d,
2009 CarswellNfld & P.E.I.R. 269 (Can. Nfld.) (WL).
158. See, e.g., Rudden, supra note 152, at 18 (“It may be that BART’s expectation that a
DRB will strictly enforce a contract is unrealistic and fails to consider that a DRB weighs
heavily the risks a contractor takes in preparing its bid.”).
159. See Robert H. Mnookin, Why Negotiations Fail: An Exploration of Barriers to the
Resolution of Conflict, 8 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 235, 248-49 (1993).
160. See Seifert, supra note 117, at 151-52. (“The [board] acts as an expert and not as an
adjudicator.”); supra note 134.
161. This is therefore part of the braiding of formal and informal contracting techniques
described by Gilson, Scott, and Sabel. See Gilson et al., supra note 73, at 1403.
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ex tempore contracting function. The board’s frequent site visits
allow the board to hear updates and complaints from the parties
involved in day-to-day operations. Industry expertise allows the
board to credibly respond to queries without the delay necessary to
obtain technical advice. 
Boards frequently decline to use their expert industry knowledge
to resolve matters when independent legal grounds exist for a
decision,162 even going so far as to cite judicial authority for their
views.163 Parties frequently concede the more technically compli-
cated factual questions, such as whether a project has all of its ADA
tiles or traffic signals have achieved “full actuation,”164 leaving the
board to situate those factual questions into the context of the
162. For example, in one case the contractor argued that the owner’s timeline was both
nonsensical—that is, the owner’s calculations did not make sense on their own terms—and
unrealistic. See SR 555/US 17 - Golden Eagle - Contract Time Issue 9 (Fla. Dep’t of Transp.
Aug. 19, 2002) (recommendation), available at http://www.dot.state.fl.us/construction/
CONSTADM/drb/decisions/D1/PastYears/Dist%201%20US-17%20Golden%20Eagle%
20Contract%20Time%20Impacts.pdf.
163. See, e.g., Appeal of J. Lawson Jones Constr. Co., 86-1 BCA P 18, 719, at *45 (1986);
see also Municipality of Anchorage v. Frank Coluccio Constr. Co., 826 P.2d 316, 319-20
(Alaska 1992) (noting that the contract provided that “[t]he panel shall enter formal Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law to identify its decision-making process”). Parties may also cite
judicial authority to convince boards. See, e.g., SR 555/US 17 - Golden Eagle - Contract Time
Issue, supra note 162, at 12 (noting that the contractor cited Rumsey v. United States, 88 Ct.
Cl. 254 (1939), among others, in its rebuttal).
164. Actuation is the process by which lights can be configured to change in response to
traffic, such as using sub-surface induction loops to detect cars and trigger light changes. See
generally KITTLESON & ASSOCIATES, INC., SIGNAL TIMING MANUAL (2008) (describing actuation
techniques). The FDOT argued that full actuation would have required induction loops to be
installed on the main roads and infrared detectors on the minor streets. SR 26 Critical End
Dates 2 (Fla. Dep’t of Transp. Nov. 30, 2006) (recommendation), available at http://www.dot.
state.fl.us/construction/CONSTADM/drb/decisions/D2/D2SR26CriticalEndDates.pdf.
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contract.165 When boards make technical evaluations,166 they often
do so to reach legal or contractual matters.167
The dispute board’s predilection for determining contract duties,
rather than simply making technical assessments, is consistent with
what other scholars have noted about construction disputes: they
are overwhelmingly contractual in nature.168 One study of govern-
ment construction contracts found that nearly one-third of all
disputes between 1980 and 2004 concerned either contract interpre-
tation or modification of the contract to accommodate unexpected
problems and additional work.169 Relatively few turn on factual
disputes on highly technical matters, such as a claim that the owner
165. For example, one contract exempted from deadline any “minor signal work, friction
course, and patterned textured pavement.” SR 26 Critical End Dates, supra note 164, at 2.
The contractor argued that ADA tiles are traditionally added after the friction course because
tiles can crack in the process of adding that final layer of asphalt. Id. The friction course is a
top layer of asphalt that provides traction and drainage. Definition: Friction Course, N. FLA.
ROADS, http://www.northfloridaroads.com/glossary/details.asp?GlossaryID=4 (last visited Mar.
2, 2014). If the friction course can be added after September 1 without penalty, the contractor
argued, so too could the ADA tiles. SR 26 Critical End Dates, supra note 164, at 3. The
contractor also argued that the remaining effort to achieve full actuation was only “minor
signal work.” Id. Though the dispute was factually dense, the facts were not in dispute.
Instead the board was called upon to evaluate whether late installation was penalized under
the contract. Id.
166. See, e.g., SR 200 (A1A) - Differing Site Conditions Concerning Muck Removal &
Subsurface Clay 11 (Fla. Dep’t of Transp. Nov. 12, 2011) (recommendation), available at
http://www.dot.state.fl.us/Construction/CONSTADM/drb/decisions/D2/2011/E2N36_210687-
3_SR200_DiffSiteCondition_MuckRemoval.pdf (noting that “[b]orings data was not reported
for right offsets” and that “anticipated muck depth information was taken from muck probes,
which … are not reliable”).
167. See, e.g., id. at 11-12 (concluding that “the muck depth condition” was not a “differing
site condition” entitling the contractor to additional compensation).
168. See Kurt L. Dettman et al., Resolving Megaproject Claims: Lessons from Boston’s “Big
Dig,” CONSTRUCTION LAW., Spring 2010, at 5, 47 n.28 (“In the early phase of the Project, it was
assumed that the majority of claims would involve technical, rather than legal, issues. As the
Project gained experience in how claims were handled by the [board], the Project concluded
that ... many claims involved legal issues.”). 
169. J. Cletus Goetz II & G. Edward Gibson Jr., Construction Litigation, U.S. General
Services Administration, 1980-2004, in 1 J. LEGAL AFF. & DISP. RESOL. ENGINEERING &
CONSTRUCTION 40, 43-44 (2009) (finding contract interpretation to be the second most
important subject of litigation of government construction contracts after modifications); see
also Jeffrey Joseph Kilian, A Forensic Analysis of Construction Litigation, U.S. Navy
Engineering Command 39 (May 2003) (unpublished M.S. thesis, University of Texas at
Austin) (“The majority of cases were assigned to the category of ‘Interpretation of Contracts.’”).
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furnished problematic equipment or that the finished project was of
unacceptable quality.170
This procedure can have dramatic results. Dispute boards are
lauded as remarkably effective in swiftly preventing, reducing, or
eliminating conflict.171 One paper noting a marked decline in
disputes and litigation from 1980 to 2004 among U.S. government-
sponsored projects, particularly contract disputes, attributes the
decline in part to increasing use of dispute board-type procedures.172
Dispute boards are able to resolve 98 percent of potential disputes
without subsequent mediation, arbitration, or litigation.173 
Dispute resolution costs are widely believed to be far lower with
a dispute board in place.174 One study of the Big Dig175 found that
the cost of dispute board procedures averaged about $30,000-
$40,000 per dispute, about $20,000 less than mediation and
substantially less than litigation.176 Another dispute board expert
estimated that the typical cost of a dispute board is about 2 percent
of the disputed amount, as opposed to 12 percent for arbitration.177
170. See Goetz & Gibson, supra note 169 (noting that acceptance and owner’s equipment
disputes made up less than forty disputes of the more than 600 surveyed). 
171. See, e.g., BARRY B. BRAMBLE & MARK D. CIPOLLINI, SYNTHESIS OF HIGHWAY PRACTICE
214: RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES TO AVOID CONSTRUCTION CLAIMS 20-21, 27 (1995).
172. Goetz & Gibson, supra note 169, at 45-46. Compare Christopher R. Seppala,
International Construction Contract Disputes—Commentary on ICC Awards Dealing with the
FIDIC International Conditions of Contract, 16 INT’L CONSTRUCTION L. REV. 339, 340 (1999)
(noting that construction made up over 20 percent of ICC arbitration in the 1980s), with
Publication of Construction Arbitration Report, INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (2001),
https://web.archive.org/web/20090109134006/http://www.iccwbo.org/court/arbitration/id414
1/index.html (noting that construction is down to 14-20 percent of cases referred to ICC
arbitration).
173. REDUCING CONSTRUCTION COSTS, supra note 4, at 16. 
174. See Kathleen M. J. Harmon, Construction Conflicts and Dispute Review Boards:
Attitudes and Opinions of Construction Industry Members, DISP. RESOL. J., Nov. 2003-Jan.
2004, at 66, 71 (reporting that 77 percent of survey respondents thought it keeps dispute costs
down, 84 percent said it reduces the cost of outside counsel, and 55 percent said it reduces the
costs of consultants); accord Harold V. McKittrick, The Dispute Resolution Board Process: A
Report Card, DISP. RESOL. BOARD FOUND. F., Feb. 2005, at 1, 1.
175. The Big Dig, an excavation project rerouting Boston’s Interstate 93, is among the
largest engineering works in history and is sometimes compared to the Panama Canal.
Michael Grunwald, Dig the Big Dig, WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/04/AR2006080401755.html.
176. Harmon, supra note 138, at 24.
177. Chern, supra note 138, at 5.
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These costs do not include the intangible cost of the time,
attention, and emotional well-being of key employees.178 Dispute
boards score better on these axes as well.179 The engineer or
architect in particular has a lessened adjudicatory function under
this scheme, freeing a high-value professional to focus on her core
competencies.180 This is one way in which agent determination can
sometimes be less costly than party-driven mechanisms. 
Many believe that dispute boards reduce bid price181 by signaling
the owner as nonlitigious182 and contractors reduce their risk
premium for capricious or difficult claims processes.183 Low bid
prices are attractive indicia of dispute boards’ merits for many
public owners who may be less sensitive to subsequent savings than
initial price. 
Traditionally, project architects have provided on-site resolutions
of disputes. Many scholars have described the architect on terms
similar to this discussion of dispute boards, at least on the temporal
axis of providing determination in the interim position.184 Yet the
architect is an agent of the owner. The rise of independent dispute
boards highlights the value in ex tempore contracting of interim
determination by a third party. First, contractors have been
increasingly aware of the architect’s incentive to side with the owner
and have therefore found her determinations to be less
satisfactory.185 If architects ever were the neutral third parties that
178. See Harmon, supra note 174, at 69 (observing that 85 percent of respondents agreed
that DRBs reduce the indirect costs, such as management focus and manpower that might
otherwise be deployed to other projects). Like most nonlawyers, construction professionals
generally dislike conflict and legal engagement. Id. at 70 (noting that 89 percent of
professionals interviewed said disputes have emotional costs).
179. See id. (finding that 58 percent said DRB use increased their job satisfaction and 69
percent said it reduced stress). 
180. See Chapman, supra note 109, at 17-18.
181. See, e.g., James Denning, More Than an Underground Success, CIV. ENGINEERING.,
Dec. 1993, at 42.
182. See Harmon, supra note 174, at 71 (noting that 95 percent of those polled indicated
that dispute board use indicates willingness in the owner to resolve disputes without
arbitration and litigation).
183. See Chapman, supra note 109, at 14.
184. See Macneil, supra note 23, at 866; Williamson, supra note 22, at 249-50.
185. The recent rise of the dispute board comes with the waning influence of the architect
on job sites. One reason may be the growing importance of the Middle Eastern and former
Soviet bloc countries as construction sites. Owners in those countries frequently exercise
active control over day-to-day management of the project and more directly constrain the
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dispute boards are, that time has passed.186 When legitimacy
matters to determination, one can no longer obtain it from architect
determination. Likewise, credible determinations may matter more
as the industry becomes more fragmented. When the firms become
smaller, more specialized, or international, parties may become less
able to directly evaluate the quality of their counterparty.187 Clearer
signals of past behavior may be required. In such contexts, third-
party determinations of credibility matter outside of the instant
transaction. Dispute boards offer parties the neutral determination
they cannot get from internal governance mechanisms.188
The specialization of the architectural profession—its separation
from the role of engineer, general contractor, and the rest—has
raised the cost and lowered the benefit of using them for dispute
management. They no longer possess cross-disciplinary expertise
nor have unrivaled on-the-ground knowledge. They are also not ex-
perts in dispute management. The use of specialized dispute
management bodies, obtained by contract with others, can be an ef-
fective way for the project to relieve architects of a job they no
longer provide most cheaply. Thus, the American Institute of Archi-
tect’s (AIA) adoption of dispute boards “was an acknowledgement of
long-running criticism from nearly all quarters that questioned the
designer’s independence, competence, and desire to serve in this
capacity.”189
Dispute boards are also a means of controlling multi-party
disputes in cases that might have been daunting projects to com-
plete at all, let alone at an attractive price. Although dispute boards
are popular in developed markets, some of their earliest and most
prominent uses were high-risk international projects. For example,
the Ertan Hydroelectric Project in China’s Szechuan Province was
independence of the engineer, limiting their appearance of neutrality. ROBINSON, supra note
103, at 98.
186. But see Bastanielli, supra note 121, at 12-13. 
187. See, e.g., infra note 191 and accompanying text. Project owners in jurisdictions in the
developing world that lack credible courts use dispute boards to signal their quality to
international donors and lenders. Pierre M. Genton, DRB/DAV: An Attractive Procedure if
One Takes Certain Precautions, DISP. RESOL. BOARD FOUND. F., 2000.
188. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Multi-Door Contract and Other Possibilities, 13 OHIO
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 303, 360 (1998).
189. 2 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 26, § 5:20.20, at 17 (footnote omitted).
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huge, costing $2 billion and taking nine years.190 The project was
organizationally complex—designed by one Chinese firm, with
another Chinese firm as engineer, an Italian firm heading the dam
construction, a German firm leading the drilling effort, as well as
three other international contractors supporting both tasks, and
then the subcontractors and suppliers—all in a complicated political
and commercial environment.191 Forty claims went to the dispute
review board for formal review by the Swedish, UK, and Columbian
board.192 All of the decisions were either accepted or settled.193
Within six months of project completion, there were no outstanding
disputes.194
Dispute boards are relatively new contracting tools,195 but they
have gained endorsement from governments, international organi-
zations, and scholars.196 Essentially unused twenty years ago, dis-
pute boards are now in place in more than $140 billion in projects.197
The standard form construction documents from the four principal
providers of these forms now include dispute boards by default.198
Four U.S. states require dispute boards in nearly all transportation
projects,199 and the U.S. Department of Transportation Federal
190. China’s Ertan Hydroelectric Project, supra note 133, at 18.
191. See id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Chapman, supra note 109, at 6-7.
195. The first use of a dispute board may have been the Boundary Dam in Washington in
the 1960s, which had a “Joint Consulting Board.” Id. at 3.
196. See, e.g., Stipanowich, supra note 7, at 500.
197. See Chapman, supra note 109, at 5.
198. FIDIC began including dispute boards in several of its form documents beginning in
1999. Id. at 4. AIA’s standard form document, as of 2008, provided for an Initial Decision
Maker (IDM), which is similar to a DRB. Bastanielli, supra note 121, at 10. The Construction
Owners Association of America (COAA) and the Associated General Contractors of America
(AGC) have provided on their standard form documents for parties to choose between either
mediation or a DRB. Id. at 10.
199. See  DISP. RESOL. BOARD FOUND., PRACTICES & PROCEDURES § 1.3, at 3 (2007),
available at http://www.drb.org/manual/Section_1_QuickPrint_11-07.pdf (“California, Florida,
Massachusetts and Washington are the largest users [of DRBs].... The California Department
of Transportation (Caltrans) and Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT) use DRBs on
almost all projects.”); see also CALTRANS, CPB 10-5, CHANGES TO THE DISPUTE REVIEW BOARD
PROCESS 1 (2010), available at http://www.dot.ca.gov/hq/construc/cpb/CPB10-5.pdf (noting that
the California Department of Transportation has used DRBs since 1994); DISP. RESOL. BOARD
FOUND., supra § 1.3, at 3 (“Idaho, Minnesota, Mississippi, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina,
Utah, Virginia and Wisconsin have active DRBs.”).
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Highway Administration strongly endorses the practice.200 The
World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and other multinational
development banks all require use of dispute boards at essentially
all projects they fund.201 Even the 2012 Olympics made use of a
dispute board.202
Dispute boards are marvelously successful, and their main
activity seems to be determination of contractual responsibilities,
quite apart from any fact-finding or expert evaluation. Parties prize
the ability to determine their obligations and entitlements on an
ongoing basis. This assistance matters a great deal in construction
when ex post determination through adjudication is costly due to
incentive problems, adjudication costs, and transaction costs.203 But
ex ante contracting can be more costly still because of uncertainty.204
Parties seem to like that they can leave the contract unresolved on
some issues, but they need not wait until adjudication to clarify the
contract. They trust the board to fill in the gaps and sharpen the
vague terms when, and only when, questions as to duties arise.205 A
dispute board clause combines an apparently vague term, like
“workmanlike” or “unforeseeable,” with a mechanism for specifying
it on an ongoing basis. By including both the vague term and the
dispute board clause, the parties have included an ex tempore
contracting structure in their relationship. 
B. Credit Derivatives
Construction contracts increasingly utilize a technique of
including putatively vague terms, coupled with a mechanism for
rapid specification, thereby saving on both ex ante and ex post
200. See U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., DISPUTE REVIEW BOARDS: RESOLVING CONSTRUCTION
CONFLICTS (2001), available at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/construction/fs02009.pdf.
201. See CHERN, supra note 5, at 9-10; Carrol S. Dorgan, The ICC’s New Dispute Board
Rules, 22 INT’L CONSTRUCTION L. REV. 142, 143 (2005).
202. Joshua Rozenberg, London 2012: Lawyers Poised for Olympic Disputes, BBC (Mar. 6,
2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-17261126.
203. See Harmon, supra note 174, at 69, 71.
204. See Tirole, supra note 31, at 743.
205. See Chapman, supra note 109, at 2; Christopher R. Drahozal & Keith N. Hylton, The
Economics of Litigation and Arbitration: An Application to Franchise Contracts, 32 J. LEGAL
STUD. 549, 551 (2003).
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costs.206 High finance increasingly turns to similar techniques, for
similar reasons. Consider the contracts constituting a credit default
swap. This contract provides the buyer with insurance against the
default of some other financial asset, such as a bond.207 The insured
individual receives payment from the seller if the bond is in
default.208 
The transaction costs to draft and agree to such contracts are
quite high,209 but when the market is relatively thick, parties may
be able to institutionalize their common contracting problems with
the help of institutions.210 ISDA provides standard form contracts
that document the majority of the world’s financial derivatives.211
ISDA employs about 3000 people in its documentation committee,212
which reacts quickly to modify documents—striking terms, redefin-
ing them—to remain efficient as legal and economic circumstances
change.213 Parties have overwhelmingly availed themselves of
ISDA’s documentation.214
Preference for ISDA documentation is partially a result of strong
network externalities in the form of comprehensibility and fungibil-
206. See supra Part II.A.
207. See Shikha Gupta, Credit Default Swap: Regulations, Changes and Systemic Risk, 3
RES. J. FIN. & ACCT. 27, 29 (2012).
208. Id. at 28.
209. E.g., Jeffrey Golden, Setting Standards in the Evolution of Swap Documentation, INT’L
FIN. L. REV., May 1994, at 18, 18 (“Market participants fought about everything.”); Sean
Vanatta, Libor’s Risks Emerged from Clubby London Banking Culture, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 14,
2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-14/libor-s-risks-emerged-from-clubby-london-
banking-culture.html (“Nonuniformity was a significant problem.”); Sean M. Flanagan, Note,
The Rise of a Trade Association: Group Interactions Within the International Swaps and
Derivatives Association, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 211, 235-36 (2001) (“[D]ifferences between
the participants were too great for a consensus to be reached.”).
210. Gilson et al., supra note 61, at 176-77.
211. Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit Derivatives, 75
U. CIN. L. REV. 1019, 1025 (2007).
212. Anna Gelpern, Commentary, Contracts as Organizations, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 57, 65
(2009).
213. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Contract as Statute, 104 MICH. L. REV.
1129, 1144 (2006).
214. See INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, ISDA MARGIN SURVEY 2012, at 3 (2012),
available at http://www2.isda.org/functional-areas/research/surveys/margin-surveys/ (follow
“ISDA Margin Survey 2012” PDF link) (stating that 85 percent of the approximately 138,000
collateral agreements in use in the OTC derivative market at 2011’s end were ISDA
agreements).
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ity in the eyes of other market participants.215 Widespread use and
ISDA’s careful intervention in the law-making process in many
nations have resulted in privileged regulatory treatment; deviation
from standard form contracts limits preferential treatment in
bankruptcy.216 ISDA contracts have been tested in courts and are
supplemented by legal opinions permitting enforceability and
netting.217 Netting allows swap participants to aggregate the net
payments or obligations under a series of swaps, canceling out
offsetting entitlements, to arrive at a single operative sum.218
Without netting, a bankrupt’s estate may be able to cherry-pick
among its derivative transactions, modifying or canceling some that
require the bankrupt to pay, while continuing to collect on others.219
For example, suppose Bank had agreed to an interest swap in which
Bank will pay to Company 6 percent of a given sum, and Company
will pay to Bank a floating rate that fluctuates around 6 percent.
Company then files for bankruptcy. With netting, Company’s estate
owes, or is owed, an amount close to zero, because the two swaps
were of equal and offsetting value. Without netting, Company’s
estate might sue to continue to collect the fixed 6 percent payment
from Bank as an asset of the estate, but might not pay its variable
215. See James C. duPont, Comment, A Second Chance at Legal Uncertainty: AIG Collapse
Provides Impetus to Regulate Credit Default Swaps, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 843, 865-66 (2009)
(“Standardization of contract terms.... would render CDSs more fungible for purposes of
exchange trading. Efforts to create standardized CDS contracts to facilitate exchange trading
could be undertaken without substantial difficulty by referencing the ISDA’s Master Swap
Agreement.”) (footnote omitted); see also Barry Le Vine, Comment, The Derivative Market’s
Black Sheep, 31 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 699, 713 (2011) (noting lack of fungibility as a cost of
customized contracts).
216. See Gelpern, supra note 212, at 66-67.
217. Id. (“ISDA ... has obtained legal opinions from local counsel in over forty countries
attesting to the enforceability of netting provisions in their contracts.”); see also Opinions,
INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, https://www2.isda.org/functional-areas/legal-and-
documentation/opinions/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2014) (“[T]he ISDA opinions address the
enforceability of the termination, bilateral close-out netting and multibranch netting
provisions of the 1992 and 2002 Master Agreements.... ISDA also solicits legal opinions on the
enforceability of the ISDA Credit Support Documents in various jurisdictions, also updated
on an annual basis.”).
218. See Nathaniel G. Dutt, Current United States Credit Default Swap Regulatory
Initiatives: A New World Standard or Just a Ploy?, 16 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 169, 180-81
& n.62 (2009).
219. INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, ISDA RESEARCH NOTES 7 (2009), available at
http://www.isda.org/researchnotes/pdf/ISDA-Research-Notes2.pdf.
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obligation to Bank in full if the estate did not have enough assets to
make all creditors whole. Netting is one of several benefits afforded
ISDA swaps. 
As with construction, the preference for standard contracts raises
the cost for those who wish to greatly particularize the document for
their own purposes. Participants who excessively modify their swap
contracts cannot be guaranteed that the law or market participants
will treat their agreements with the same deference given ISDA
documents.220 Thus, industry solutions to the transaction costs
associated with front-end contracting raises the costs for those
parties who wish to contract for non-standard arrangements.221 The
standardization is only greater in the exchange-traded market,
where no negotiation is allowed at all.222
In addition to transaction costs, the derivatives space contem-
plates the challenges of substantial uncertainty. These contracts are
used precisely in markets in which uncertain risk is deemed difficult
to control, making elaborated contracts impossible.223 
ISDA’s documentation does not provide a fully articulated
definition of the term “default.” How could it? The universe of
potential defaults is infinite, as is the universe of items that could
be the subject of a credit default swap. Is default triggered when the
issuer misses a payment? What if the bonds are current, but the
issuer uses the threat of dilution under domestic law to coerce
voluntary forbearance, as in the case of Greece?224 What if the bond
documents allow a grace period of thirty days, whereas related loan
agreements provided for only three days, as in the case of Italian
firm SEAT Pagine Gialle?225 Even if it were possible to anticipate
220. See Choi & Gulati, supra note 213, at 1142 (“The deference courts give to the intent
and guidance of a standard setter [such as ISDA] is important.”).
221. See Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 211, at 1025.
222. See Treasury’s Proposal Mandating Clearing of “Standardized” Swaps, INT’L SWAPS
& DERIVATIVES ASS’N (Sept. 2009), http://www.isda.org/c_and_a/pdf/isda-mandated-clearing-
standardized-swaps.pdf.
223. See Anna Gelpern & Mitu Gulati, CDS Zombies, 13 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 347, 350-
51 (2012) (“[S]overeign defaults are tail-risk events.”); cf. Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 211,
at 1025 (“[C]redit default agreements have become standardized.”) (footnote omitted).
224. Gretchen Morgenson, Scare Tactics in Greece, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/20/business/credit-default-swaps-as-a-scare-tactic-in-
greece.html.
225. Chris Whittall, Dealers Slam CDS Committee “Bias,” REUTERS (Dec. 12, 2011, 4:36
AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/12/seat-cds-idUSL6E7NC14E20111212.
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every potential fact pattern, it is plain that the best explication of
“default” might differ from transaction to transaction, but the form
contract must be written with ample generality. 
If it is costly to determine responsibilities ex ante, ex post
determination in court later is costlier still.226 Generalist courts may
not understand complex financial arrangements, making errors
more likely.227 Financial firms have fewer hard assets for a plaintiff
to eventually seize, particularly in a time of financial insecurity,
which decreases the chance that plaintiffs can be made whole.228 
Obligational clarity is also important for regulatory reasons:
banks and other financial firms may be required to raise additional
capital if they cannot claim that their swap-related assets, or CDS-
insured bonds, are in good standing.229 Financial assets can change
in value quickly,230 making prompt determination vital.
Because ex ante contracting that anticipates the many futures of
the contract and ex post determination are both undesirable, the
derivatives space has increasingly relied on ex tempore contracting.
Like construction contracts, ISDA contracts include numerous
underspecified provisions, like “default.” ISDA has for decades
played a role in determining the meaning of its contracts for
members on a going forward basis and has recently increased its
role in doing so even for existing contracts, acting as a kind of agent
for ex tempore contracting.231
226. Supra Part II.A.1.
227. See Gilson et al., supra note 61, at 200-01; supra note 67 and accompanying text.
228. See ANNELISE RILES, COLLATERAL KNOWLEDGE 38-40 (2011) (discussing debt
proceedings involving financial institutions and the role of collateral).
229. See Associated Press, Terms, Players in the Goldman Sachs Fraud Charges, SEATTLE
TIMES (Apr. 16, 2010), http://seattletimes.com/html/businesstechnology/2011627771_apussec
goldmansachsglossary.html (“[In a CDS transaction,] one side buys protection from the other
that a loan or other obligation will stay in good standing. If it doesn’t, the party that bought
the protection must be paid.”).
230. See RISK MANAGEMENT IN VOLATILE FINANCIAL MARKETS 89 (Franco Bruni et al. eds.,
1996) (“[T]he degree of financial asset price volatility may have increased over recent
decades.”).
231. Choi and Gulati have called for ISDA to play a role in updating existing contracts, a
function similar to the ex tempore contracting role now described. Choi & Gulati, supra note
213, at 1162 (proposing a framework that would allow ISDA or another third-party “to revise
constantly the meaning of boilerplate terms not only for contracts negotiated in the future but
also all previously negotiated contracts”).
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Anna Gelpern describes the power ISDA held in determining
default conditions for a variety of ISDA-drafted swaps when Japan
sought to nationalize Long-Term Credit Bank (LTCB).232 Once one
of the ten largest banks in the world, LTCB was on the verge of
disaster in 1998.233 Its default would have let its swap counterpart-
ies close out their positions, forcing a fire sale of yen-denominated
assets.234 Tokyo negotiated with ISDA to find a means of national-
ization that ISDA could endorse as not constituting a default.235
ISDA acted as an interim agent in specifying the meaning of
“default” in response to detailed fact patterns without adjudication.
It was not feasible to completely define “default” ex ante, but it
would have been a mess for courts to define it ex post, making ex
tempore an attractive technique. 
Since that time, ISDA has formalized its interim agency role
through its 2009 adoption of the Credit Derivative Determination
Committee process.236 Under this process, an ISDA credit default
swap contract provides that “the determinations of the relevant
[Determination Committee] will be binding on the contract” in
determining the terms of the contract.237 Any party to a swap
contract can request a determination from the Committee at any
time and receive a prompt, public answer.238 Key terms, such as the
definition of “default” in credit default swaps, are not thoroughly
drafted, leaving important determinations to the Determination
Committee.239 Thus, when Greece attempts to coerce investors into
tendering their sovereign bond holdings for replacements with new
terms, a credit default swap contract may give little indication of
whether this counts as a default, but parties can turn to ISDA for an
immediate answer. 
232. Gelpern, supra note 212, at 60-61.
233. See id. at 60.
234. Id. at 61.
235. Id.
236. Colleen M. Baker, Regulating the Invisible: The Case of Over-the-Counter Derivatives,
85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1287, 1359-60 (2010); The ISDA Credit Derivatives Determinations
Committees, INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N (May 2012), http://www2.isda.org/attachment/
NDM1NA==/AGM%202012_DC%20anniversary_appendix_043012.pdf.
237. The ISDA Credit Derivatives Determinations Committees, supra note 236, at 1.
238. See Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 223, at 350.
239. Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 211, at 1039.
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Whereas construction dispute boards solve intra-transactional
coordination problems by helping the multi-party construction
project to act in concert, ISDA boards help with inter-transactional
coordination.240 When ISDA specifies a CDS contract, the answer
will be the same from contract to contract, allowing market-wide
harmony and certainty.241 These determinations can be a means of
coordinating market response to shocks and perhaps to mitigate
systemic risk. Recall that ISDA’s actions in light of the LTCB
nationalization were not purely textualist,242 nor even motivated
perhaps by the interest of any particular party to the contract.
Instead, parties to ISDA swaps might be authorizing an interpretive
methodology that explicitly takes into account the effect of the
interpretation on third parties. The parties might accept such an
approach because others do, allowing ISDA to help steer the market.
The rise of Determination Committees in high finance highlights
what is and is not essential to ex tempore contracting. Determina-
tion Committees are experts in the financial markets and in the
type of transaction under consideration;243 they may know more
than either of the parties about the state of the market. But they
are not familiar with the course of dealings of every contract they
interpret; by definition, they are deciding for a whole class of
transactions. This reinforces the notion that a dispute board’s famil-
iarity with the construction project is not of intrinsic importance,
240. These coordination powers are lodged in a quasi-adjudicative apparatus, but ISDA
also has quasi-legislative power. See Gabriel V. Rauterberg & Andrew Verstein, Assessing
Transnational Private Regulation of the OTC Derivatives Market: ISDA, the BBA, and the
Future of Financial Reform, 54 VA. J. INT’L L. 9, 22 (2013).
241. See Choi & Gulati, supra note 213, at 1141; see also Gilson et al., supra note 61, at 210
(“The goal of the multilateral regime thus is to bring members together to create bilateral
arrangements that minimize the risk of general harm.”); Charles F. Sabel & William H.
Simon, Contextualizing Regimes: Institutionalization as a Response to the Limits of
Interpretation and Policy Engineering, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1265, 1298 (2012); cf. 6 BRUNER &
O’CONNOR, supra note 26, § 21:10 (explaining that the construction industry has only started
moving towards harmonization because while international form contracts are widely used,
they “address the same basic issues but, for the most part, address them differently”).
242. Cf. Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the “Passive Virtues”—A Comment on
Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1964) (characterizing
Alexander Bickel’s passive virtues theory as an argument that the Supreme Court should be
strategically principled: “100% principle[d] 20% of the time”). But see Gelpern & Gulati, supra
note 223 (arguing that ISDA’s Greek bond treatment was strategically textualist).
243. The ISDA Credit Derivatives Determinations Committees, supra note 236, at 2.
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but is extrinsically valuable as a means to expedite efficacious
determinations. It also underscores the fact that ex tempore
contracting is not simply a new form of bilateral adjudication.
III. THEORIZING EX TEMPORE CONTRACTING
This Part explores the theoretical and practical implications of
the pervasiveness and importance of ex tempore contracting.244 Schol-
ars, courts, and contracting parties frequently use the ex ante / ex
post dichotomy to understand the contractual landscape. This Part
identifies three areas in which observers typically reason from only
two of the three relevant contracting options. Once one identifies ex
tempore contracting as a pervasive and useful concept, all of these
conclusions stand ready for re-examination.
First, courts sometimes characterize dispute boards as adjunct to
party-led contracting, say, as mere mediators.245 Other times, they
incorporate dispute boards as full-on arbitrators.246 Neither
approach accurately characterizes dispute boards or their role in ex
tempore contracting. Acute awareness of the parties’ choice to use
ex tempore contracting enables judges to interpret in a manner that
facilitates that choice.247 
244. Ex tempore contracting has important implications for scholars far beyond contract
theory. The ex ante / ex post dichotomy draws on administrative lawyers’ discussions of rules
versus standards. On rules and standards, see Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of
Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 73 (1983); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An
Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974); Kaplow, supra note 42;
Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 592-93 (1988). Thus
ex tempore contracting’s lessons should have implications far beyond the study of contracts.
Interestingly, the rules/standards literature was already sensitized to some of these concerns:
Kaplow was aware that there is a difference between timing of choice and choice of chooser
(as between legislature, regulator, or court). Kaplow, supra note 42, at 608-11. Other scholars
have hinted at ex tempore features in corporate law and regulation generally. See Gilson et
al., supra note 61, at 185-89; Henry Hansmann, Corporation and Contract, 8 AM. L. & ECON.
REV. 1, 14 (2006); Darryl Biggar, Why Regulate? The Transaction Cost Approach to Public
Utility Regulation, Workshop at the Center for Research in Regulated Industries 31st Annual
Eastern Conference (May 18, 2012) (on file with author).
245. E.g., L.A. Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth. v. Shea-Kiewit-Kenny, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 431, 435
(Ct. App. 1997).
246. Cf. Welcon (1976) Ltd. v. Town Council of S. River, 2006 CarswellNfld. & P.E.I.R. 199,
para. 4 (Can. Nfld.) (WL), aff ’d, 2009 CarswellNfld. & P.E.I.R. 269 (Can. Nfld.) (WL).
247. Infra Part III.A.
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Second, scholars unaware of ex tempore contracting are likely to
accept a direct relationship between ex ante and ex post contracting,
in which a decrease in the cost of one will rationally result in the
decreased use of the other.248 This direct relationship is easy to
model and seductive in its promised normative insights. If we wish
parties to engage in more of one type of contracting, we can raise the
cost of the other. Parties with three contracting tools, however, may
respond unpredictably, shifting into or out of ex tempore contracting
instead of the desired effect. Ex tempore contracting allows parties
to frustrate the prescribed intervention, often to the benefit of the
more sophisticated party.249 Courts must stand ready to police
fraudulent or extractive use of ex tempore contracting. 
Finally, parties who accept the ex ante / ex post dichotomy seek
to balance ex ante and ex post costs.250 In this framework, many
complex transactions must invite the sort of litigation and incentive
costs that characterized pre-dispute board construction projects. Yet
many relationships would be improved by a shift to ex tempore
contracting.251 
A. Supporting Interim Institutions
Courts have sometimes expressed outright hostility to ex tempore
contracting.252 Courts too quickly free a party of her contractual
duty to use a dispute board, often because they misunderstand the
nature of dispute boards. 
Sometimes courts mistakenly think of ex tempore contracting as
a form of mediation or structured bargaining and infer that there is
248. See Scott & Triantis, supra note 1, at 818 (“[R]eduction in back-end enforcement costs
should lead the parties to substitute more back-end for front-end investment by replacing
precise provisions with vague terms.”) (citations omitted); see also Drahozal & Hylton, supra
note 205, at 551 (“The choice of dispute resolution forum .... affects contracting costs, since
parties are more likely to leave contract provisions vague, opting for relational governance
when they have chosen a dispute resolution forum that can be trusted to reach value-
maximizing results.”) (citation omitted). 
249. Infra Part III.B.
250. See Choi & Triantis, supra note 1, at 852.
251. Infra Part III.C.
252. Cf. Choi & Gulati, supra note 213, at 1162-63 (suggesting that judicial hostility to
parties opting now to let someone update their contract later comes from undue prioritization
of the instant of contract formation, and with it the “meeting of the minds”). 
2014] EX TEMPORE CONTRACTING 1917
no advantage to forcing a party to attend a mediation if the party
expresses unwillingness to find a consensus solution or to abide by
the mediator’s judgment.253 On that basis, the court in Bombardier
Corp. v. National Railroad Passengers Corp. allowed a party to
avoid using the dispute board once the party indicated that it was
unlikely to respect the board’s eventual determination.254 
This approach is flawed for two reasons. First, the Bombardier
court’s position is that there is no advantage to letting the dispute
board make determinations if one party signals her reluctance to
listen to the board’s determination. But as a theoretical matter, ex
tempore contracting constitutes an agreement by the parties to
participate in a process, the outcome of which will determine their
contractual duties.255 One party’s threat to later disregard those
duties or to withdraw from the process does not invalidate those
duties, just as ex ante contractual responsibilities are not less
legally significant if one party announces that she no longer
considers them binding on her. So it remains important for the court
to allow the dispute board to make its determination so that it can
be clear what duties, precisely, the reluctant party is disregard-
ing.256
253. See, e.g., Bombardier Corp. v. Nat’l Passenger R.R. Corp., 298 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C.
2002); John Carlo, Inc. v. Greater Orlando Aviation Auth., No. 6:06-cv-164-Orl-22DABB, 2007
WL 430647, at *3 n.1 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 24, 2007) (describing a DRB as a “structure [sic]
mediation”); cf. Gilson et al., supra note 73, at 1422 (“A refusal to proceed further if a party
determines that a project has negative present value should not be grounds for declaring the
contract in breach.”).
254. 298 F. Supp. 2d at 4; see also L.A. Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth. v. Shea-Kiewit-Kenny,
69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 431, 435 (Ct. App. 1997) (explaining that a tribunal is effective only if it has
parties’ trust).
255. Cf. Markovits, supra note 90, at 478 (“The outcome of the arbitration is therefore, from
the perspective of the parties, just like another printed clause, save that it is post-printed
rather than pre-printed.”).
256. To be sure, in the cases in which parties may dismiss the board recommendation
without any consequence or record, courts should be more reluctant to order specific
performance in the form of permitting the board to conduct its investigation and issue an
opinion. Instead, the court should award reliance damages to the nonobstinate party in an
amount reflecting her investment in the dispute management system. See Gilson et al., supra
note 61, at 195. But see Markovits, supra note 90, at 479 (“[W]hen courts refuse to hear a
claim consigned to arbitration, they are not specifically enforcing the arbitral agreement any
more than they would be issuing specific performance were they directly to apply a price-
formula in a contract rather than deciding the price themselves.”).
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Second, as a practical matter, mediation may be futile when one
party signals a lack of openness, but dispute boards are interim
institutions with abundant nonmediation effects. The court in
Sehulster Tunnels/Pre-Con v. Traylor Bros., Inc./Obayashi Corp.
noted this and found that “although the [dispute board’s] recommen-
dation is nonbinding, it is not without precedential effect and
evidentiary influence because the Prime Contract provides for its
admissibility into evidence in any later dispute resolution or legal
proceeding.”257
Although correct to take seriously the parties’ indication to use ex
tempore contracting institutions, the Traylor Bros. court then
invalidated the dispute board for precisely the opposite reason as
Bombardier. The court found a dispute board clause unconscionable
as applied to a subcontractor who had no right to appoint her own
member to the board.258 The court deemed it unfair for her to be
bound by a process in which only the contractor and owner selected
the so-called “neutral” panel.259 As though evaluating an adjudica-
tory tribunal, the Traylor Bros. court held the dispute board to
procedural standards befitting adjudication. 
Both the Traylor Bros. and Bombardier approaches needlessly
limit the utility of dispute boards. Better decisions have correctly
understood the ex tempore contracting function of dispute boards,
requiring even grumbling parties to participate in the dispute board
process260 and allowing dispute board clauses to apply to subcontrac-
tors.261 This is the right result as a practical matter because the
utility of dispute boards comes largely from their ability to consti-
tute a contractual structure for a large number of actors. Dispute
boards would be hobbled if silent to all subcontractor claims, or they
would be bloated and exorbitantly expensive if procedural justice
required boards to represent each constituency. 
This is also the jurisprudentially legitimate result. Daniel
Markovits has described arbitration as coming in two varieties:
257. 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 655, 667 (Ct. App. 2003).
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. John Carlo, Inc. v. Greater Orlando Aviation Auth., No. 6:06-cv-164-Orl-22DAB, 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7739, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 7, 2007); BAE Automated Sys. v. Morse Diesel
Int’l, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 0217, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6682, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2001).
261. E.g., Dart Mech. Corp. v. XL Specialty Ins., 593 F. Supp. 2d 464, 470 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
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third-party arbitration, in which the parties have essentially
exercised a right of forum selection, and first-party or “gap-filling”
arbitration, in which the tribunal acts to write the parties’ incom-
plete contract for them.262 He persuasively argues that when
arbitrators act as substitutes for courts in third-party arbitration,
they must meet equivalent due process standards as court-con-
ducted adjudication.263 Of such arbitration, one might object to
unfair procedures, such as the panel being chosen and paid solely by
one’s counterparty.264 But when arbitrators act only as the parties’
agents to spell out the parties’ particularized duties, the arbitration
need not meet the highest standards of procedural due process.
Instead, the agreement to arbitrate must meet different standards:
“the procedural standards that govern contracts namely fraud,
duress, and procedural unconscionability in contract negotiations
and good faith in contract performance.”265 The question ceases to be
one of the arbitration’s fairness and becomes one of the process by
which one agreed to the arbitration. 
Ex tempore contracting is not arbitration because it operates in
the interim position and generally does not produce an executable
judgment,266 but Markovits’s analysis is applicable here. The ex
ante / ex post framework, into which ex tempore contracting is
situated, contemplates delegation of contract specification.267 Ex
tempore contracting is analogous to first-party arbitral activity and
should be judged by the relevant standard. That means subcontrac-
tors cannot readily complain about the composition of the dispute
board or its determinations, but they can object if they did not
consent to the dispute board or if they did subject to it under fraud
or duress.
That is not to say that courts should be indifferent to the conduct
of the interim institution. When parties use mechanisms like these,
one of a court’s most important jobs is to prevent one party from
using ex tempore contracting to opportunistically expropriate
262. Markovits, supra note 90, at 470-71, 475.
263. Id. at 477.
264. Whether any particular challenge will be meritorious is another matter. See AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1743 (2011). 
265. Markovits, supra note 90, at 477.
266. Supra note 135 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text. 
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wealth from its counterparty.268 Courts must be on the watch for
interim institutions that act to one party’s benefit in a way the other
party should not have expected or was led to not expect.269 This may
seem commonsensical, but it runs counter to advice frequently given
to courts. This Article discusses this notion presently in the next
Section. 
Courts must take some other steps to support dispute boards as
interim institutions. They must stay the statute of limitations at
least for a reasonable time while parties engage the dispute
board.270 They should resist interpretations that allow parties to
frustrate the dispute board process, such as by firing their board
member and refusing to appoint a new one.271
Finally, when parties have made their intention to use a dispute
board clear, the court should take the board’s determination
seriously. That means letting the dispute board determination enter
the factual record without live testimony. Those parties that create
a public record will usually prefer that the court use the report
generated. Treating the board members as witnesses, or treating
their report as hearsay, undermines the parties’ intentions. 
When a board has already issued an opinion on a dispute, the
court must not consider the dispute de novo. Rather, courts should
do as the parties instructed, and include dispute board determina-
tions in the record as part of the contract, to be read in conjunction
with the rest of the contract in determining its meaning. In practice,
courts will tend to be grateful for the clarifying power of these
reports.272 That does not mean slavish deference to the opinion—if
268. See Gilson et al., supra note 61, at 176.
269. See Markovits, supra note 90, at 477 (“Alternatively, first-party arbitration may be
structurally designed by one party to deprive the other of the very benefits that the contract
establishing the tribunal was designed to secure. This may occur, for example, because the
arbitrator is simply in the pocket of the designing party.”).
270. See Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Clark Constr. Grp., No. SA-06-CV-0125-XR, 2006 WL
2932217, at *10 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 11, 2006) (relying on evidence that the parties were
“participating in the contractually mandated dispute resolution framework” within the statute
of limitations to deny defendant’s motion for summary judgment).
271. Cf. L.A. Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth. v. Shea-Kiewit-Kenny, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 431, 434
(Ct. App. 1997) (MTA fired their own DRB appointee “for cause,” as defined in the contract,
to terminate a board member).
272. See, e.g., Kiewit-Atkinson-Kenny v. Mass. Water Res. Auth., No. 01-1920 BLS, 2002
Mass. Super. LEXIS 329, *52-53 (Sept. 3, 2002) (stating that dispute board’s conclusion
“makes sense” and accepting it).
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the parties wished that, they could have opted for arbitration.273 The
parties have struck a balance between giving away determination
power to an adjudicator and reserving it for themselves at contract
formation because they valued the type of determination the interim
agent would make. 
This advice is applicable to interim institutions outside of dispute
boards: when parties defer to ISDA or a dispute board, courts must
interpret the contract in a way that facilitates such a choice.
B. Frustrating Penalty Defaults
Scholars frequently use the ex ante / ex post dichotomy to make
predictions.274 For example, if ex post costs fall, perhaps because
adjudicators become more effective, one may predict that parties
may shift to back-end enforcement through vague language.275 Yet
these results do not follow deductively. Parties may maintain the
same degree of ex ante contracting and instead shift away from ex
tempore institutions in favor of ex post adjudication. The relation-
ship between these three elements is dynamic and not yet theorized. 
Invalid predictive inferences lead to invalid normative inferences.
Many interpretive proposals ignore the cost effect of proposals for ex
tempore contracting. It is common to say of courts that “any socially
desirable interpretive rule would trade off accuracy against
contract-writing and adjudication costs.”276 This is close to right, but
an interpretive rule that reduces ex ante costs with little effect on
ex post costs is not a priori defensible; it might come with a
overwhelming increase in ex tempore costs. 
273. Though courts should honor parties’ desire for provisionally binding boards if they so
indicate. Several international jurisdictions regularly consider board decisions to be
provisionally binding. Supra note 134. But see, e.g., PT Perusahaan Gas Negara (Persero)
TBK v. CRW Joint Operation, [2010] SGHC 202, paras. 15-16, available at
http://www.singaporelaw.sg/sglaw/laws-of-singapore/case-law/free-law/high-court-
judgements/14230-pt-perusahaan-gas-negara-pesero-tbk-v-crw-joint-operation-2010-sghc-202
(reading FIDIC contract to not be provisionally binding).
274. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 248. 
275. Drahozal & Hylton, supra note 205, at 550-51 (predicting, and then finding, more
vague terms when parties were able to lower their expected adjudication costs).
276. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Interpretation Redux, 119 YALE L.J. 926,
930 (2010); see Schwartz & Watson, supra note 46, at 2-3.
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The prevalence of ex tempore contracting chastens our confidence
about the use of certain tools, such as information-forcing penalty
defaults. Courts sometimes resort to penalty defaults, judicial gap-
filling with terms that are contrary to what the parties would likely
have chosen, in order to encourage ex ante contracting.277 This
approach can be “justified as a way to encourage the production of
information.”278 For example, in Hadley v. Baxendale a miller paid
to have a crankshaft transported for repairs.279 The shipment was
delayed, resulting in substantial lost profits.280 The contract was
silent as to the appropriate damage calculation, and the carrier was
held liable only for foreseeable damages, which were far lower than
lost profits.281
By penalizing those who ship valuable items without communi-
cating their value to carriers, Hadley encourages candid discussions
of shipment values, which help carriers to respond with socially
efficient levels of precautions. If the default rule allowed all
consequential damages, the miller would have had no incentive to
communicate the value of her package. In addition to knowledge
about the package, some millers may be legally sophisticated and
know the law better than some carriers. By selecting a default rule
against the more legally knowledgeable, a court strongly encourages
the parties to discuss the law, rather than letting the less sophisti-
cated party fall into surprising risks and duties. 
Even if most parties would prefer for the carrier to be liable for all
damages, the Hadley rule incentivizes the better-informed party to
share information that will allow more efficient transactions. The
lesson of Hadley is that courts should sometimes increase ex post
contracting costs as a means of encouraging information production
through ex ante contracting.
Yet, knowledgeable parties may not reveal information if they can
avoid the default by using ex tempore contracting. That is, instead
of responding to the judicial penalty default by candidly negotiating
a precise term, the sophisticated party may require contract
277. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 17, at 97.
278. Id. (footnote omitted).
279. (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 9 Ex. 341.
280. Id. at 146, 9 Ex. 341.
281. See id. at 145, 147-48, 151-52, 9 Ex. 341.
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specification by way of a trusted agent. Just as one party may have
superior knowledge of the default rule, or of its intention to use it,
a party may also have greater knowledge about how a given agent
will determine the terms. If a buyer is just as ignorant of the pro-
seller leanings of an interim agent as it would be of a pro-seller
default rule, then shifting the default conveys no information. 
Credit default swaps prove instructive. When nations wish to
restructure their debt, they often threaten to default on any bonds
that are not exchanged for less valuable ones, thus coercing
participation and reducing holdout problems.282 When Greece made
tender offers on its bonds at discount prices, many bondholders
resisted, trusting that they would be financially protected by CDS
contracts that they had purchased.283 
Yet Determination Committees appear to have been reluctant to
find a default.284 Perhaps this was out of fear of causing broad
damage to the financial system that could result from such a
finding.285 Alternatively, their reluctance may have been self-
interested because many members of the Determination Commit-
tees were swap dealers who would likely have had to pay billions if
they found a default.286 Others had conflicting roles. For example,
Belle Yank simultaneously (1) worked for BNP Paribas, which
represented Greece in its coercive tender offer, (2) sat on the ISDA
Determination Committee that would evaluate whether the tender
offer would trigger CDS payments, and (3) warned investors that
ISDA might not deem the arm-twisting tender as warranting CDS
payments.287 
282. See, e.g., Mitu Gulati & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Making a Voluntary Greek Debt
Exchange Work, 7 CAPITAL MARKETS L.J. 169 (2012).
283. Sandrock, supra note 10, at 516.
284. See Steve Schaefer, Greek CDS Won’t Trigger: ISDA Says No Default Yet, FORBES
(Mar. 1, 2012, 9:16 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/steveschaefer/2012/03/01/no-default-in-
greece-according-to-isda-cds-wont-trigger/ (noting ISDA decision that Greece had not
defaulted despite its restructuring causing creditors to take “53.5% haircuts on their holdings
… without triggering insurance payouts on instruments intended to protect investors from
just such a turn of events” and stating that Standard & Poor had declared Greece to be in
“selective default”).
285. Cf. Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 223, at 348 (noting “fears of systemic shock” existing
prior to ISDA decision that Greece had defaulted).
286. Lisa Pollack, The Conflicted Isda Committee, FT ALPHAVILLE: THE BLOG (Dec. 14,
2011, 4:55 PM), http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2011/12/14/799341/the-conflicted-isda-committee/.
287. Morgenson, supra note 224. For another example of alleged conflicts in the
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Swap sellers, as the most sophisticated financial institutions, and
as the majority of the members of the Determination Committees,288
may have been more likely than swap buyers to anticipate the
Derivative Committee’s reluctance to declare a default. Courts
would be naïve to think that an expansive judicial interpretation of
the word “default” will force a candid ex ante discussion between
swap buyer and swap seller. If swap sellers wish to covertly restrict
the payment conditions, they can achieve this result through
proposing their preferred interim institution rather than explicit
contracting. Whereas in the past courts might have been inclined to
trust in a penalty default, they must now scrutinize to see whether
parties are circumventing it with ex tempore contracting.
Crafting ideal interpretive rules for a game with three players
becomes quite complex, especially when the presence of ex tempore
contracting creates potential avenues for abuse by unscrupulous and
sophisticated parties. Whenever parties routinely look to a third
party for their contract, and whenever an interpretive strategy leads
them to do so, a cost is associated with that choice.289 Awareness of
ex tempore contracting encourages a more granular treatment of
contracts going forward to examine where parties may be utilizing
it to divert their joint contractual goals or deprive the other party of
the benefit of her bargain. 
Determination Committee, see Whittall, supra note 225.
288. See Pollack, supra note 286.
289. The use of indexed price terms in long-term contracts—from alumina supply contracts
to home mortgages—constitutes a use of ex tempore contracting. Use of such an index allows
parties to avoid specifying the price ex ante without having to wait for ex post adjudication
to know the price, by placing the task of setting the price in the hands of a third party agent,
the index provider. See generally Gabriel Rauterberg & Andrew Verstein, Index Theory: The
Law, Promise and Failure of Financial Indices, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 15-25 (2013) (describing
the extensive editorial and discretionary process used to create financial indices like the
Consumer Price Index and the S&P 500). Future work will apply ex tempore contracting to
the use of financial indices in contracts. See Andrew Verstein, The Ghost in the Machine: The
Legal Treatment of Indices in Contracts (2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author). Ex tempore contracting gone wrong will be shown to be one of the key variables in
explaining the manipulation of the world’s most important benchmark—Libor. See Rauterberg
& Verstein, supra note 240, at 2-5 (describing Libor’s importance); see also Liam Vaughan &
Gavin Finch, Libor Lies Revealed in Rigging of $300 Trillion Benchmark, BLOOMBERG (Jan.
28, 2013, 4:54 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-28/libor-lies-revealed-in-rigging-
of-300-trillion-benchmark.html (describing manipulation).
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Fortunately, generalist courts have long established their
capacity to oversee and police exploitation in contractual relations.
Even in a dynamic system, courts can be confident that lowering the
cost of ex tempore contracting tends to lower the total cost of
contracting. If courts can help parties protect their investments in
transactions by protecting them from the cost of bad interim
contracting agents, they give parties better options to vindicate
their ends. Thus, although awareness of ex tempore contracting
urges caution in theories of contract design and construction, it
leaves neither scholars nor courts rudderless. 
Another promising avenue in light of ex tempore contracting is
the role of nonjudicial actors in contract design.290 Courts remain
important, but they are only one of three players in contractual
determination. Scholars may want to consider advising interim
agents how best to fulfill their role291 or advising parties how best to
utilize ex tempore contracting.292 The next Section goes to the latter
purpose.
C. Prospective Applications
Ex tempore contracting is used extensively in certain industries,
but perhaps too rarely elsewhere. Dispute boards, for example, are
unique to construction.293 Recognition of ex tempore contracting
290. On the role of third party agents in front-end contracting, see Justin Sweet, Standard
Construction Contracts in the USA, 28 INT’L CONSTRUCTION L. REV. 101 (2011). 
291. See Avery Katz, Taking Private Ordering Seriously, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1745, 1757
(1996) (“[Legal scholars] could study trade association rules, not for the purpose of advising
courts and legislators whether to defer to such rules, but for the purpose of helping other
trade associations decide whether to imitate them or instead to draft their own new forms.”).
The conflicts of interest in ISDA, as a drafting agent with members acting as interim agents
and contract parties, underscore that ex tempore contracting has costs. Construction dispute
boards do not seem to have experienced similar problems. Professional organizations like AIA
and FIDIC, which draft form contracts, do not provide dispute boards and neither the
organizations nor the boards themselves will stand as owner or contractor in a construction
contract. Instead, parties select their own board members in whatever manner they see fit.
Best practices in ex tempore contracting involve managing ex tempore contracting costs, such
as those agency costs that emerge from conflicts of interest. 
292. See id. (“We could help potential litigants design and learn to use dispute-resolution
devices with better incentive properties.”).
293. John Barkai, Mediation of Construction Disputes in the United States 2 (2008)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1435380.
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should expand parties’ menu of options in difficult contracting
settings, some of which this Section now proposes.294 In addition,
this Section addresses cases in which ex tempore contracting is
preferable to party-led governance systems.
Ex tempore contracting may be useful in some business acquisi-
tions, particularly those contemplating the use of an earnout
provision. Earnouts make the sale price, often of a business,
contingent upon some measure of performance, often profits.295
Earnout agreements can serve several economic purposes, such as
helping the parties agree upon a price despite information asymme-
try. The buyer need not come to believe the seller’s proposed
valuation.296 The fixed price can be the seller’s lower estimate, and
the seller can receive a bonus if the business does as well as the
seller promises. For example, in the well-known Bloor v. Falstaff
Brewing Corp. case, Falstaff agreed to pay $4 million for Ballantine
Breweries, plus $0.50 per barrel sold in the next six years.297
Ballantine was then selling about 2.2 million barrels per year,
making the purchase price something like $10 million if the sales
stayed up, as a seller would promise, but less if sales slowed, as a
buyer would fear.298 
Economists love earnouts, but parties rarely use them because
they pose risks of opportunism.299 In Bloor, Falstaff might have
diverted Ballantine Beer sales in favor of its own product. Falstaff
need not have bought Ballantine just to destroy it; the earnout gave
Falstaff an incentive to divert for the first six years and then begin
optimal investment once the earnout period was over.300 
294. Scholars rarely lead practitioners in contractual innovation, but it is always possible
that a practice is so new or so closely identified with one domain that it is clearer from a
distance how it might work. Cf. NICOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 2 (W.K. Marriott trans.,
1992) (“[T]hose who draw landscapes place themselves below in the plain to contemplate the
nature of the mountains.”).
295. GOLDBERG, supra note 71, at 152.
296. See Gilson, supra note 31, at 262-63.
297. 601 F.2d 609, 610 (2d Cir. 1979).
298. See GOLDBERG, supra note 71, at 144.
299. See id. at 152 (finding only 153 earnout provisions in a set of over 9000 acquisitions);
Scott R. Peppet, Contract Formation in Imperfect Markets: Should We Use Mediators in
Deals?, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 283, 319 (2004) (explaining that earnouts are often
bought out of M&A deals just prior to closing, due in part to mistrust and fear of
opportunism).
300. When the seller retains some control over the business, seller opportunism is just as
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A fully state-contingent sales contract, with a complex formula
modifying purchase price for every event that might occur in the
earnout period, can align the parties’ incentives for efficient
performance.301 But such ex ante contracting specificity is not
feasible,302 so parties often use “best efforts” clauses.303 Ex post
adjudication of such vague duties is expensive. First, such terms
invite the parties to provide costly economic and legal analysis to
the court. Second, the acquired party is likely to lose corporate
existence before too long, making it an unlikely plaintiff or defen-
dant for ex post determination. Ongoing determinations could
provide guidance before the seller is gone. 
Finally, any ex post mechanism powerful enough to deter
wasteful and self-serving actions is likely to chill good actions that
both parties should want to encourage. Suppose the manager of an
acquired seller contemplates paying a retention bonus to its
employees, which she believes is a prudent outlay that supports the
whole venture. She may worry that the buyer will later allege that
this is shortsighted opportunism, pushing employees to make sales
within the earnout window that will come at the expense of next
year’s order.304 Or suppose a buyer contemplates offering customers
a discount on purchases that include both the seller’s division’s
product and the buyer’s primary product. The buyer believes this is
surplus generating and good for all parties, but she may fear that it
will later appear to have been chiseling the seller’s division’s profits.
The seller may allege that the buyer violated the contract by using
the seller’s product as a loss leader in order to encourage sales of the
buyer’s products in the bundle.305 Such litigation is particularly
likely if either strategy fails. In either case, the risk that the actor
much of a problem because the earnout gives the seller a myopic view of enterprise success.
She is rewarded for profits during the earnout period, but not after, so she may underinvest
in long-term quality. She may defer maintenance and reinvestment, or engage in “channel
stuffing” in order to improve profits now at the expense of post-earnout period profits.
301. See Gilson, supra note 31, at 266. 
302. Id. at 267.
303. See, e.g., Sonoran Scanners, Inc. v. Perkinelmer, Inc., 585 F.3d 535, 544 (1st Cir. 2009)
(finding an implied duty to exert “reasonable efforts to develop and promote [seller’s]
technology”); Bloor v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 601 F.2d 609, 610 (2d Cir. 1979).
304. See, e.g., Comet Sys., Inc. v. MIVA, Inc., 980 A.2d 1024, 1027-28 (Del. Ch. 2008).
305. See, e.g., LaPoint v. AmerisourceBergen Corp., No. 327-CC, 2007 Del. Ch. LEXIS 131,
at *23-24 (2007), aff ’d, 956 A.2d 642 (Del. 2008).
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could be later adjudged to have violated the earnout might deter
efficient behavior. The foregoing demonstrates that ex ante and ex
post contracting is costly for earnouts, and that determination at
performance is much better than a later determination.306 
Before parties give up on earnouts, they might consider appoint-
ing an “earnout board.” A board of neutral experts could convene at
the consummation of a large acquisition to periodically observe the
performance of the sale in transition. They could interview the
managers, examine compensation structures, and query any
changes to sales and maintenance practices. They could make
provisionally binding modifications to the sale price to reflect buyer
or seller opportunism or determine whether the manager’s behavior
efficiently supports the venture as a whole. Although it is difficult
to predict the future or to second-guess business decisions, the
boards could provide contemporaneous guidance on many cases. By
determining in the moment that a manager’s strategy appears
intended to grow the business or in conformance with ordinary
practices, they could give comfort to managers who might otherwise
fear strategic, post-performance litigation. Likewise, a board’s
determination of opportunism could help lead to early remedial
efforts.
Many other candidates for ex tempore contracting use may
present themselves.307 Infrastructure projects and government
contracting have structural features that intuitively parallel
construction. The entertainment industry, automobile production,
and legal services have been likened to construction because of their
dynamic projects and ever-changing teams.308 We might add
business and technology outsourcing and labor relations to the list
of long-term collaborations in which ex ante specification of duties
is unfeasible, but ex post determination comes too late and at too
306. If the analogy between corporate acquisitions and construction remains unconvincing,
consider the following: an acquirer purchases a firm that is engaging in its own construction
project. For the duration of the earnout, the seller’s in-house construction team and the buyer
stand in relation of contractor and owner. 
307. For other suggestions that agents be permitted to update contracts on an ongoing
basis, see Oren Bar-Gill & Kevin Davis, Empty Promises, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 37 (2010); Yoon-
Ho Alex Lee & K. Jeremy Ko, Consumer Mistakes in the Mortgage Market: Choosing Unwisely
Versus Not Switching Wisely, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 417, 456-57 (2012). 
308. See Klein & Gulati, supra note 25, at 143.
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great a cost. It is rarely feasible for either a hospital or patient to ex
ante contract for services rendered, but ex post contracting may be
unsatisfactory;309 perhaps one could introduce healthcare dispute
boards. 
Substantial intellectual energy is currently devoted to studying
how parties can contract for innovation.310 Research and develop-
ment partnerships and patent pools exemplify inter-firm sharing
and collaboration, but the potential future product is too little
known to permit reasonable contracting. Who can say what
applications might be found once our patents are pooled for
research, and what profit and control allocation would be most
efficient? It is impractical to engage in extensive ex ante contracting
here;311 but ex post enforcement is likely to be costly, if only because
adjudicators are unlikely to understand the twists and turns of this
particular partnering relationship. Governance systems for real-
time determination already thrive in this space, with procedures for
information exchange and for cross-party dispute management.312
Gilson and his coauthors describe two pharmaceutical companies’
procedures: lower-level employees try to reach unanimous agree-
ment on how to proceed, and if they cannot do so the disagreement
moves up the hierarchy, all the way to the CEOs if necessary.313 
Yet there are times when independent, third-party determination
might be valuable. For example, when the parties are numerous, it
may be costly to come to agreement. The CEOs may be happy to
work out their subordinates’ problems in a bilateral joint venture,
but a multilateral agreement could prove taxing on the C-suite’s
time.
Likewise, when many parties’ interests are aligned against an
outlier, as with construction when so many subcontractors stand to
lose whenever the contractor loses, multilateral majoritarianism
309. See Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, Patients as Consumers: Courts, Contracts, and
the New Medical Marketplace, 106 MICH. L. REV. 643, 666-67 (2008).
310. See, e.g., Bozovic & Hadfield, supra note 73, at 6; Gilson et al., supra note 73, at 1383.
311. Cf. George T. Heery, Employing Standing Dispute Resolution Panels with the Bridging
Method of Design and Construction Procurement, in REDUCING CONSTRUCTION COSTS, supra
note 4, at 25 (noting the flaws in believing that one can determine particular details of a
construction contract before the design phase of the project).
312. See Gilson et al., supra note 1 (providing a theory to explain the “braiding” of explicit
and implicit contracts that occurs in many firms).
313. Id. at 469-70.
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may lack legitimacy. A neutral third party may be more effective
and garner greater acceptance. 
Third-party determinations may be helpful in order to establish
legitimacy to future contracting partners who may trust an
independent board. This may be more important when parties may
not repeat interactions with one another or when poor quality and
bad faith activity are not evident to third parties.314 
As with the derivatives space, boards can also be a mechanism for
coordinating an industry. A board that serves in many innovative
spaces could provide nonproprietary guidance as to industry norms
and best practices to guide the instant transaction and set stan-
dards. Conforming to industry norms may matter little to some
entrepreneurial Silicon Valley collaborations, but it may matter
more in government-led projects or healthcare pricing. 
Finally, independent boards may be helpful in disencumbering
the parties themselves from handling this operation. Although
invoking the CEOs may help resolve disagreements, the CEO’s time
is valuable. Further, a good CEO may not be a good dispute
manager, lacking either the appropriate personal or scientific skills.
Further, the time necessary to educate each level of management as
to the content of the dispute may quickly mount. A specialized body
familiar with the project, the relevant science, and the art of
managing disputes could help, and companies may be able to
procure such a body more cheaply outside of the firms. This sort of
economizing becomes attractive as disputes become more likely and
more costly.
CONCLUSION
Parties to contracts are commonly thought to have two options to
formally determine their responsibilities. They may specify terms
themselves on the front end, or they may leave terms vague or
absent so that a judge might specify them on the back end. This ex
ante / ex post framework has proven attractive in many contexts but
remains fundamentally limited. In fact, parties frequently delegate
314. See id. at 454.
2014] EX TEMPORE CONTRACTING 1931
to a noncourt agent the responsibility of specifying their responsibil-
ities on an ongoing basis. 
This Article introduced the term “ex tempore” contracting to
describe the choice by parties to leave terms unspecified but provide
for ongoing specification by a trusted, noncourt agent. This phenom-
enon is more prevalent than it may have been thought. This Article
introduced the use of dispute boards in construction, showing that
ex tempore contracting is rapidly taming construction’s infamous
litigation costs. Ex tempore contracting is likewise common in
financial derivatives. 
Recognizing the widespread use of ex tempore contracting is the
first step toward a rational treatment of it. Therefore, a solid
theoretical understanding of ex tempore contracting has important
implications. Aware of ex tempore contracting, courts can support
parties’ choice by neither understating its legal significance as mere
mediation nor overstating its procedural requirements as befitting
arbitration. The existence of ex tempore contracting destabilizes
many scholarly inferences, such as an endorsement of penalty
defaults, while reinforcing courts’ role in policing fraudulent uses of
ex tempore contracting. Finally, contracting parties should consider
whether increased use of ex tempore contracting could support their
objectives. 
Whereas many scholars think of contract design as on a line from
ex ante to ex post, the correct metaphor is a triangle, with ex
tempore providing a genuinely different option from the ones
usually discussed. Future work is required to explore the implica-
tions for ex tempore contracting for particular areas of contract
design, and to update settled assumptions in recent contract
literature to accommodate this third point in the triangle. 
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TABLES
Table 3
Examples
Timing of Choice
Contract
formation Performance
After
transaction
Identity
of
Chooser
Parties #1 Dickered,precise contract
#2 Conditional
Term;
modification
#3
Settlement;
subsequent
contracting
Agent
#4 Standard form
contract;
Negotiating
agent
#5 Dispute
Boards,
ISDA derivatives; 
#6
Arbitration
Court #7 Defaultcontractual terms
#8 Preliminary
Injunctions; 
Declaratory
Judgments 
#9
Litigation
Table 4
Method of
expressing intent to
use this
determinative
selection in contract
Timing of Choice
Contract
formation Performance
After
transaction
Identity
of
Chooser
Parties #1 Precise term
#2 Conditional
Term, agreement to
agree, party-driven
governance
agreement
#3 Short
term
contracts
Agent
#4 Standard
form contract
#5 Interim terms:
vague language
with interim agent
#6 Vague
contract
language
plus
arbitration
clause
Court #7 Choice of lawclause
#8 Vague contract
language 
#9 Vague
contract
language
